Spring 7-1-2013

Nearing Thirty Years: The Burger Court, Strickland v. Washington,
and the Parameters of the Right to Counsel
Joshua E. Kastenberg
University of New Mexico - School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facultyscholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joshua E. Kastenberg, Nearing Thirty Years: The Burger Court, Strickland v. Washington, and the
Parameters of the Right to Counsel, 14 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 215 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facultyscholarship/438

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the UNM School of Law at UNM Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu,
lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

THE JOURNAL OF
APPELLATE PRACTICE
AND PROCESS
ARTICLE
NEARING THIRTY YEARS: THE BURGER COURT,
STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, AND THE
PARAMETERS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL*
Joshua Kastenberg**
I. INTRODUCTION

The right to a fair criminal trial-including the right to be
represented by counsel'-is a cornerstone of American
democracy. As the Supreme Court held in Gideon v.

*This article relies in part on research conducted by the author in the papers of various
judges. With the exception of the Bazelon papers, which are housed at the Biddle Law
Library at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, all collections cited in this article
are available in the Library of Congress's Manuscripts Division. The notations for the
collections are as follows: Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. [WJB]; Justice Byron R. White
[BRW]; Justice Thurgood Marshall [TM]; Justice Harry A. Blackmun [HAB]; Judge Frank
Minis Johnson, Jr., of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth (1979-81) and
Eleventh (1981-99) Circuits [FMJ]; Judge Harold Leventhal of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit [HL]; and Judge David L. Bazelon of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit [DLB-BLL]; in each
case, the judge's initials are followed by the number of the box in which the document is
stored. Thus, "[HAB/410]," infra n. 6, is a reference to Box 410 of the Blackmun papers.
**Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force. Military Judge, United States Air Force
Trial Judiciary.
1. See U.S. Const. amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . .. to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 14, No. 2 (Fall 2013)
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Wainwright,2 the fourteenth amendment right to counsel applies
in all state felony trials, requiring the states to provide counsel to
indigent and poor defendants. Although it overturned Betts v.
Brady,3 which had held that the fourteenth amendment did not
require states to provide defense counsel to indigent defendants
in non-capital trials, Gideon was not as controversial as other
Warren Court decisions.4 It was, however, to become one of the
more influential decisions in modern judicial history. Gideon did
not address the minimum competency or performance standards
required of defense counsel, but the decision would be further
expanded to cover all criminal proceedings, which would in turn
affect the threshold question of competency and effective
representation.
In 1967, the Court applied Gideon to juvenile proceedings.
In 1970, the Court determined that the right to counsel
encompassed the right to effective assistance of counsel in guilty
pleas. 6 In 1972, the Court extended Gideon to misdemeanor
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Justice Black, who wrote for the Court in Gideon, was also
the author of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) in which the Court held that
[tihe purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to counsel is to protect an
accused from conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and
constitutional rights, and the guaranty would be nullified by a determination that
an accused's ignorant failure to claim his rights removes the protection of the
Constitution.
Id. at 465. Although the Court did not, by express language, use the term "effective
counsel," the Johnson analysis would essentially be incorporated into later decisions
equating the right to counsel to the right to the effective assistance of counsel.
3. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright,372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
4. See Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court andAmerican Politics 379-84 (Belknap

Press 2000) (indicating that Gideon was non-controversial and could even be characterized
as "popular"); see also e.g. Bernard Schwartz, Earl Warren, in The Warren Court: A

Retrospective 268-69 (Bernard Schwartz ed., Oxford U. Press 1996) (indicating that
Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was the Warren Court's "most controversial"
decision).
5. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967) ("Just as ... the assistance of counsel is
essential for purposes of waiver proceedings, so we hold now that it is equally essential for
the determination of delinquency, carrying with it the awesome prospect of incarceration in
a state institution until the juvenile reaches the age of 21.").
6. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970) ("It has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."
(citations omitted)). Interestingly, Justice O'Connor would later state that Strickland
"elaborates" McMann, but this elaboration language is absent from the conference
memorandum. See Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to the Conf. Re:
Case Held for Strickland v. Washington-Fosterv. Lankford (May 14, 1984) [HAB/410];
see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). In Tollett, the issue was whether
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trials;7 although Justice Black and Chief Justice Warren had
retired from the Court by then, a majority of Justices appeared to
accept the principle that the right to counsel is given a maximum
interpretation whenever the deprivation of liberty is involved.
As a result, it is clear that all persons, regardless of economic
standing, have the right to the assistance of counsel in criminal
trials. None of these decisions, however, described the degree of
competent representation to which a defendant is entitled.
Twelve years later, in Strickland v. Washington,8 the Court
issued a standard for determining when defense counsel's
ineffective performance, through no direct fault of the
prosecution, law enforcement, public, or judiciary, undermined
the fairness of a trial such that a conviction or sentence had to be
rendered as a violation of due process. The standard requires a
demonstration that counsel's representation "fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness," and then a showing that
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." 9 Federal and state appellate courts have cited
Strickland over 10,000 times, and there are hundreds of law
review articles directly stemming from the decision. However,
none presents Strickland's judicial history. Those articles that
approach a historical analysis do not utilize primary sources
such as the conference memoranda and correspondence of the
judges and Justices involved in the decision. This article begins
to fill that gap.
Part II provides a historical backdrop to Strickland,
including an analysis of how judicial standards governing
ineffective-assistance assertions evolved in the appellate courts
after Powell v. Alabama.10 Importantly, prior to Strickland, the
defense counsel's advice to plead guilty without advising the defendant that a colorable
motion for appropriate relief based on the exclusion of minorities from a grand jury pool
did not, in and of itself, give rise to an automatic reversal of the conviction and retrial. Id.
at 266.
7. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 704 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) ("We hold, therefore, that absent a
knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial.").
8. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
9. See e.g. Padilla v. Ky., 559 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2010) (quoting Strickland).

10. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (concluding that "in a capital case, where the defendant is
unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense, . . . it is
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Court denied certiorari in several cases involving claims of
ineffective counsel."
Part III examines United States v. DeCoster,12 a thricereviewed D.C. Circuit decision that several circuits adopted
prior to Strickland, but which was expressly rejected by a Fifth
Circuit panel, the en banc Eleventh Circuit and, in some
measure, ultimately the Supreme Court.' 3 Notably, DeCoster
developed an outcome-determinative test for prejudice, which
the Court in Strickland found problematic.
Part IV summarizes Strickland's appellate traverse from the
state trial through the en banc Eleventh Circuit, including an
analysis of judicial intent in the majority, concurring, and
dissenting judges of the en banc Eleventh Circuit.
Part V analyzes the conference deliberations within the
Supreme Court, discerning how the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions in Strickland were initially drafted and then
modified through a process of compromises. This section also
examines the Court's contemporaneous deliberations in United
States v. Cronic,14 a companion decision that arose as a result of
a judge's refusal to grant defense counsel a continuance.
the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law"). This is the famous "Scottsboro Boys" case.
11. See e.g. Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1976) (declining to
depart from farce-and-mockery standard and pointing out that "the courts cannot guarantee
errorless counsel or counsel who cannot be made to seem ineffective by hindsight"), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977); Matthews v. Wingo, 474 F.2d 1266, 1268 (6th Cir.)
(explaining that "[i]f a criminal defendant is to prevail on an allegation of ineffective
assistance of counsel he must demonstrate that what was done or not done by his attorney
made his defense a farce and mockery of justice that would be shocking to the conscience
of the court"), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 985 (1973); U.S. v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir.
1949) (noting, in accordance with then-developing standard, that "[a] lack of effective
assistance of counsel must be of such a kind as to shock the conscience of the Court and
make the proceedings a farce and mockery ofjustice"), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950).
12. 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
13. See Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532, 1557 (11th Cir. 1983) ("In Washington
v. Strickland .

. . ,

this court held that a habeas petitioner may prevail on an ineffective

assistance claim only if he shows denial of effective assistance and actual prejudice to the
course of his defense. In so doing we rejected the allegedly harsher standard of prejudice
set forth in United States v. DeCoster."), cert granted &judgment vacated, 468 U.S. 1206
& 468 U.S. 1212 (1984); Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1261 (5th Cir. 1982)
("We reject the outcome-determinative test in DeCoster for reasons analogous to those that
lead us to reject the Chapman standard."), rev'd, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). This last reversal
came in Strickland v. Washington itself.
14. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
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Part VI analyzes likely judicial intent in Strickland by
considering statements about ineffective assistance made in
cases decided prior to Chief Justice Burger's retirement,
including not only Nix v. Whiteside,15 but also Kimmelman v.
Morrison,16 Burger v. Kemp, and Penson v. Ohio." This
section also analyzes cases held for Strickland at the Supreme
Court, including those remanded and those in which certiorari
was denied. Finally, this section provides an overview of the
discussion between Justice Stevens, the author of Cronic, and
Justice O'Connor on their differences as to which cases required
remand.
Section VII, the article's conclusion, presents a model for
applying the legal history underlying Strickland to ineffectiveassistance cases.
Prior to delving into the substance, readers should note that
there are several approaches to legal history, this article being a
history of the deliberative processes in Strickland, beginning
with a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit, through the en banc
Eleventh Circuit, and then the Supreme Court. As such a
deliberation-focused history, it presents a new basis for
analyzing the judicial intent underlying Strickland, but does not
express an opinion about whether Strickland is either too
conservative or too permissive.
Of course, only a final published opinion bears precedential
weight in the federal courts. 19 Yet a legal history involving the
federal courts has to be more than a final decision standing
alone, and a legal history of a continuously cited decision can
help both practitioners and courts, providing context for
important standards of criminal jurisprudence. To achieve such a
context, the Justices and their decisions must be analyzed
alongside the political and social environment of the times in
which the opinions are issued. Certainly one Strickland-related
15. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
16. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
17. 483 U.S. 776 (1987). The original name of this case was Burger v. Zant; see 718
F.2d 979 (11th Cir. 1983).
18. 488 U.S. 475 (1988).
19. See e.g. Darr v. Buford, 339 U.S. 226 (1950) (Frankfurter & Black, JJ., dissenting)
(pointing out that the Court "has said again and again and again" that a denial of certiorari
"has no legal significance whatever bearing on the merits of the claim"), overruled in part
on othergrounds, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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factor, but by no means the sole factor worthy of consideration
here, was an increase in the number of ineffective-assistance
claims in the federal courts at the time of Strickland.20
It has been argued that President Nixon created the Burger
Court with the dual intent of responding to a rise in crime and
overturning many of the Warren Court's controversial decisions,
includin such criminal-procedure decisions as Miranda v.
Arizona. But Strickland does not fit into either of these
categories. Clearly there was a desire on the Court not to
permissively expand on the numbers of ineffective-assistance
cases, but there was also the intent to have the legal profession,
through the ABA and state bar associations, establish standards
of professional responsibility and regulate defense counsel.2 2
20. See e.g. David L. Shapiro, FederalHabeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87

Harv. L. Rev 321, 331 (1973) (indicating that denial and ineffective assistance of counsel
were the most frequent reasons for habeas filings in 1970, 1971, and 1972); Robert M.
Cover & T. Alexander Alienikoff, DialecticalFederalism:Habeas Corpus and the Court,

86 Yale L.J. 1035, 1083 (1977) (predicting that "[t]he adoption by most jurisdictions of the
reasonable competence standard will increase the number of ineffective assistance claims,"
resulting in "intrusive inquiries by federal district courts into state provision and control of
counsel").
21. See e.g. Thomas M. Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court in History: The Road
to Modern Judicial Conservatism 113-19 (U. Chi. Press 2004); Earl Maltz, The Chief

Justiceship of Warren Burger 18-23 (U. S.C. Press 2000) (summarizing conservative
credentials of Nixon nominees to the Court).
22. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. That Chief Justice Burger had served on an
ABA defense-counsel-standards committee prior to Strickland is surely of some relevance
to the decision. See e.g. Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards:Forty Years of Excellence, 23 Crim. Just. 10 (Winter 2009); see also Stephen B.
Bright, The Politics of Crime and the Death Penalty: Not "Soft on Crime," But Hardon the

Bill of Rights, 39 St. Louis U. L.J. 479, 498 (1995) ("The Supreme Court shares a major
responsibility for the shameful quality of counsel that is tolerated in the nation's courts.
Chief Justice Warren Burger was going around the country talking about how trial lawyers
were incompetent at the very same time that the Court he presided over was adopting a
standard that amounts to nothing more than 'close enough for government work' in
Strickland vs. Washington."); Edward A. Tamm & Paul C. Reardon, Warren E. Burger and

the Administration of Justice, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 447, 500 (noting that "Burger's
expressions of concern about the training of lawyers go back about two decades," and that
he had complained in the late 1960s about "cases ... being inadequately tried by poorly
trained lawyers"); Warren E. Burger, The ABA Standardsfor Criminal Justice, 12 Am.

Crim. L. Rev. 251 (1974) (introducing a symposium on the Standards); cf David L.
Bazelon, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir., Speech, The Realities of Gideon and
Argersinger (Los Angeles, Cal. Nov. 19, 1975) (asserting that, while Gideon and
Argersinger were crucial decisions, they resulted in an increase in under-qualified defense
counsel, and pointing out that "Judge Edward Tamm, a former trial judge for many years
puts the figure as high as 98%," that Chief Justice Burger believed that "the performance
of a 'mere' 75% of trial lawyers is deficient," and that "[t]here is virtually universal
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It also must be noted from the outset that Strickland was a
death-penalty case, and several judges and Justices, including
Justices Brennan and Marshall, certainly approached it with the
idea that the Court had wrongly decided the constitutionality of
23
capital punishment. Despite the fact that the Court had
distinguished death-penalty cases from others, 24 it would
ultimately create a universal standard of review for ineffectiveassistance cases regardless of crime or sentence. That Strickland
was a capital-murder case contributed to what can fairly be
described as passionate judicial debates at all levels, including
on the Court. But the overarching debate was over the extent to
which the Sixth Amendment governed the competency of
counsel.
From the record of available conference notes and other
papers, it is clear that Justice O'Connor, along with Justices
Stevens, Powell, and Blackmun, intended to find a middle
ground between the varying decisions of the federal courts of
appeal, several of which had developed disparate tests for
ineffective-assistance appeals. However, the Court created that
standard with the intention that the test for ineffective assistance
would apply only to deficiencies implicating constitutional
rights. That is, omissions on the part of counsel such as the
failure to object to the admission of unconstitutional evidence,
as well as the failure to object to the admission of constitutional
evidence such as un-confronted hearsay, or the strategic
decisions to pursue certain lines of defense would not constitute
a prejudicial abridgement of the Sixth Amendment. Thus,
Strickland was not part of a conservative judiciary's attempt to
diminish the Warren Court's legacy. Strickland was, in the end,
a pragmatic approach to a critical constitutional issue.
II. EVOLVING STANDARDS PRIOR TO STRICKLAND

Although Gideon is one guidepost for assessing the
relationship between effective assistance and due process, the
modern roots of the test for effective assistance predate Gideon.
agreement among judges and lawyers alike that a shockingly large proportion of the
criminal bar are at best mediocre trial lawyers") [DLB-BLL/43].
23. See Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
24. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
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In Powell, for example, the case that began the line of counselcompetency decisions, the Court held that the trial judge's
pushing unprepared defense counsel to trial denied the
defendants effective representation. 25
In Glasser v. United States,2 6 the Court held that a judge
cannot interfere with a defendant's right to conflict-free counsel,
because a conflict arising from dual or multiple representation
could conceivably impair a trial lawyer's effectiveness. 27 In
Geders v. United States,28 the Court determined that when a trial
judge sequesters a defendant from conferring with counsel, the
interference in the attorney-client relationship constitutes a
deprivation of assistance of counsel. 29 In Cuyler v. Sullivan,30
the Court determined that an actual conflict of interest that
affected the defense counsel's performance could be enough to
require the reversal of a conviction. 31 Powell and Geders
stemmed from influences external to the defense counsel.
Glasser and Cuyler involved defense counsel's departure from
clear ethical rules regarding multiple representation. Many
claims of ineffective assistance would have no analogue to any
of these four decisions.
Prior to Strickland, some federal courts of appeals had
considered claims of ineffective assistance stemming solely
from the performance of counsel. The D.C. Circuit, for example,
25. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 72 (reversing judgments below and recognizing
"fundamental nature" of right to counsel in a capital case). Although the Court did not
directly rule on the conditions under which the Scottsboro Boys were prosecuted, the
Justices acknowledged that an angry white mob acted to intimidate defense counsel as well
as potential defense witnesses and thereby subverted due process. See e.g. Michael J.
Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Strugglefor Racial

Equality, 123-25 (Oxford U. Press 2004) (analyzing the Court's establishment of the right
to counsel as paramount instead of concentrating on a racist mob's influence on the
courtroom proceedings in Powell).
26. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
27. Id. at 75-76. Interestingly, Glasser was a former U.S. Attorney and was presumed
to know the rules on multiple representation and professional conduct. Id. at 88
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
28. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
29. Id. at 88-89.
30. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
31. Id. at 350 (holding that "the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a
criminal conviction" and explaining that "[i]n order to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth
Amendment rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer's performance").
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established the farce-and-mockery test in Diggs v. Welch, 32
requiring proof that counsel's performance was so incompetent
or negligent as to make the trial proceedings "a farce and a
mocker of justice.",33 Other courts, including the Sixth, 34
Eighth, Ninth,3 6 and Tenth37 Circuits, also adopted this
standard for assessing ineffective-assistance claims. 8 The
common feature of each court's farce-and-mockery test was
difficulty of proof because Powell continued to be the basis by
which to measure effectiveness of counsel even though few
criminal trials would come close to matching the egregious
conditions under which the Scottsboro Boys were prosecuted.
The farce-and-mockery standard was gradually abandoned
in the fifteen years prior to Strickland in favor of assessing
counsel's performance against the ABA's standards of diligence
and ethics. 39 In 1970, for example, the Fifth Circuit abandoned

32. 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
33. Id. at 670. It bears noting that in 1945, the federal judiciary was much more
constrained in granting habeas appeals from state courts than it would become four decades
later, and the standards of effective representation at that time were less well defined by
ethics rules than at the time of Strickland.As a result, few habeas petitions from state trials
were granted, both because of a restrictive model of federalism and the difficulty of
showing that the proceedings amounted to a "farce and mockery of justice." See e.g. Larry
W. Yackle, The HabeasHagioscope, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev 2331 (1993); Dallin H. Oaks, Legal
History on the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 451 (1966); Paul M.
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,76 Hary.

L. Rev. 441, 486-87 (1963).
34. O'Malley v. U.S., 285 F.2d 733, 734 (6th Cir. 1961) (holding that failure to call
specific witnesses did not constitute a farce and mockery).
35. Cardarellav. U.S., 375 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1967).
36. Cofield v. U.S., 263 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1959), vacated on other grounds, 360 U.S.

472 (1959) (noting that the circumstances surrounding defendant's original guilty plea
justified a remand for entry of a new plea).
37. Goforth v. U.S., 314 F.2d 868, 872 (10th Cir. 1963) (determining that counsel's
appointment moments before trial did not render him ineffective because the transcript
showed his "active and effective participation in the trial [and] his alertness and timely
objections," his conduct of "appropriate cross-examination" and his clear presentation of
Goforth's defense).
38. See generally e.g. Sanjay K. Chhablani, Disentangling the Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 60 Syr. L. Rev. 1, 12-15 (2009).
39. See e.g. Tom Zimpelman, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era, 63 S.C. L.

Rev. 425, 451-52 (2011) (describing move from farce-and-mockery standard to
ineffective-assistance standard); Beasley v. US., 497 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) (noting
that farce-and-mockery standard is outdated and holding "that the assistance of counsel
required under the Sixth Amendment is counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering
reasonably effective assistance"); Moore v. US., 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) ("[Tlhe
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farce and mockery in Caraway v. Beto40 and instead applied a
standard of "reasonably effective assistance."

In 1982, the Second Circuit in Trapnell v. United States4 1
noted that while it had abandoned "farce and mockery" for
"reasonably competent assistance," no court had adequately
distinguished the two standards from one another.42 Moreover,
farce and mockery had been applied in much the same manner
as the newer standard, rendering the difference more a matter of
semantics than a real distinction. 43
One of the more important decisions predating Strickland
was Marzullo v. Maryland,4 in which the Fourth Circuit held
that "farce and mockery" had outlived its usefulness because it
originated in an era before the right to counsel had become an
absolute rule.4 5 Marzullo was charged with two separate rapes,
but the first victim failed to identify him. The appointed public
defender, who had only briefly met with Marzullo, did not ask
for a new jury when the prosecutor moved to dismiss the first
indictment, explaining in the jury's presence that the first victim
had originally identified Marzullo. The Fourth Circuit found
counsel ineffective for failing to move the trial court to dismiss
the jury after its members heard the prosecutor's statement. Only
Justices White and Rehnquist voted to grant the state's petition
for certiorari, 4 6 Justice White noting that the standards for
standard of adequacy of legal services as in other professions is the exercise of the
customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place.").
40. 421 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1970). Caraway is important for understanding the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Strickland, even though the court did not cite Caraway in Strickland.
Caraway's lawyer met with him for a single fifteen-minute period before trial and then
failed both to interview and subpoena witness and to object to irrelevant and prejudicial
prosecution evidence. Although other courts of appeals had upheld convictions under
similar facts, the Fifth Circuit determined in Caraway that defense counsel's performance
fell below professional standards of competence, a lower threshold than that posed by the
farce-and-mockery standard, and concluded that "[p]etitioner's counsel did not adequately
prepare himself for his client's defense, and therefore petitioner did not receive adequate
assistance of counsel." Id. at 637-38.
41. 725 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1983).
42. Id. at 153.
43. Id. at 154.
44. 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977).
45. Id. at 543 ("[W]e have usually judged effective representation by determining
whether counsel furnished reasonably adequate services instead of inquiring whether the
representation was so poor as to make a farce of the trial.").
46. 434 U.S. 1011 (1978) (White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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reviewing claims of ineffective assistance were "in disarray,"
and that Marzullo " resent[ed] an appropriate occasion for
addressing this issue." Apparently, no other Justices agreed.
III. DECOSTER AND THE OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE TEST
A jury convicted DeCoster of assault with a deadly weapon
and aiding an armed robbery4 8 after his counsel failed to timely
raise motions to the trial court, never obtained a transcript of the
preliminary hearing, and, most important, failed to interview a
single witness before trial. 49 Like the appellant in Strickland,
DeCoster did not initially seek relief on the basis of ineffective
assistance. However, the D.C. Circuit raised the issue sua
sponte, and remanded for a rehearing on the issue of
ineffectiveness. Joined by Judge Wright, Judge Bazelon noted
that the court could not second-guess defense counsel's
"strategic and tactical" decisions unless they were uninformed as
a result of inadequate preparation.5 0 Judge Bazelon further
pointed out that although the D.C. Circuit had previously
adopted the farce-and-mockery test, it had been replaced in 1967
with a less rigorous "gross incompetence" formula that stemmed
from the ABA standards.
The two most important aspects of DeCoster I were, first,
that the D.C. Circuit advanced a threshold measurement for
establishing defense counsel's effectiveness that was based in
the ABA standards.5 2 Second, the court followed the Supreme
Court's decision in Chapman v. California by placing the
47. Id. at 1011-12. Note that only Justice White's papers contain information on
Marzullo. His collection includes a draft and final dissent, but no correspondence with any
other Justice. See [BRW/I:422].
48. U.S. v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (DeCoster1).

49. U.S. v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 199-200 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (DeCosterIII)
(noting that the victim was a soldier, that police officers witnessed the robbery, and that
both the victim and police identified DeCoster on the night of the attack, but that as a result
of a permanent eye injury, the victim could not identify DeCoster at trial).
50. DeCosterI, 487 F.2d at 1201.

51. Id. (citing Bruce v. U.S., 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967)). For unexplained reasons,
Judge Bazelon indicated there that the D.C. Circuit first used "farce and mockery" in Jones
v. Huff 152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945), see DeCosterI, 487 F.2d at 1201, but Diggs slightly
predated Jones. See supra text accompanying n. 32; see also David L. Bazelon, The
Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev 1, 28 n. 76 (1973).

52. 487 F.2d at 1203.
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burden of proving lack of prejudice on the government 53
because ineffective assistance would seldom be obvious on the
plain reading of a transcript.5 4 Judge MacKinnon agreed with the
standard for judging counsel's effectiveness, but could agree
with neither the panel's shifting the burden of proof to the
government nor its conclusion that counsel's performance had
been inadequate under the gross-incompetence standard. 5
Although the DeCoster I court ordered a remand to
determine whether effective counsel would have yielded a
different result, the trial court found after a three-day hearing
that the government had met its burden and denied DeCoster's
motion for a new trial. On appeal after remand,5 6 the panel, with
Judge MacKinnon once more dissenting, determined that trial
counsel had failed in a "substantial" way to conduct a proper
factual investigation and that the government's burden of proof
had not been met, and again remanded.5 7
Judge Bazelon was acutely aware that both DeCoster I and
DeCoster H presented a significant legal development. While
the DeCoster II decision was pending, he wrote to Judges
Wright and MacKinnon:
I realize that this case has been pending for a long time. It
is vital, however, that we not allow its age to color our
judgment. Our opinion in DeCoster (I) is part of a major
development in the law; since it was decided, three
additional circuits have adopted the "reasonably
competent" standard, making it the majority rule.5 8
But Judge MacKinnon saw things differently:
53. Id. at 1204 n. 34 (citing Chapman v. Cal., 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
54. Id. at 1204 (pointing out that "when counsel fails to conduct an investigation," for
example, "the record may not indicate which witnesses he could have called, or defenses
he could have raised").
55. DeCoster I, 487 F.2d at 1205 (MacKinnon J., dissenting). Judge MacKinnon also
wanted to use the term "inadequate," instead of "ineffective." Id.
56. US. v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 300 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (DeCoster II) (appearing as an
appendix to DeCosterIII).

57. DeCoster II, 624 F.2d at 309-10 (reasoning that the failure was substantial because
a thorough investigation would have helped DeCoster "make a better informed decision
whether to go to trial, or whether to seek a plea agreement comparable to his two
codefendants"').
58. David L. Bazelon, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir., Memo. to J. Skelly Wright
& George E. MacKinnon, JJ., U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir. (Sept. 2, 1975) (footnote
omitted) [DLB-BLL/43].
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I would affirm the judgment of the trial court. It represents
the opinion of an unusually competent trial judge, with
great experience as a lawyer in the defense of defendants in
criminal cases and who, I would say, leans to favor such
defendants if it is reasonably possible to do so.59
He also accused Judges Bazelon and Wright of "disregard[ing]
the facts and law applicable" and creating "an unjustified
switching of the burden of proof to reverse a conviction of an
admittedly guilty defendant." 60
Judge MacKinnon, who pushed for an en banc decision
rather than wait for a possible grant of certiorari, had begun to
express his anger with Judge Bazelon prior to DeCoster II. In
one draft dissent, he placed statistics showing that Judges
Bazelon and Wright together led all federal appellate judges in
61
overturning convictions. Judge Wright and Judge Bazelon
countered that Judge MacKinnon's statistics were misleading
and had no place in a dissent. 62 Judge MacKinnon also took
deleted passages from Judge Bazelon's previously circulated
drafts and placed them in his proposed dissent. 63 Judge
59. George E. MacKinnon, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir., Memo. to David L.
Bazelon & J. Skelly Wright, JJ., U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir. (Nov 4, 1975) [DLBBLL/43].
60. DeCoster III, 624 F.2d at 313 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). For more information
on the D.C. Circuit around the time of the DeCosterdecisions, see Christopher P. Banks,
Judicial Politics in the D.C. Circuit Court 39 (Johns Hopkins U. Press 1999)

(characterizing that era's D.C. Circuit as able "to legislate judicially" because its "core
group of unusually gifted judges"-a group in which the author includes both MacKinnon
and Bazelon-mastered administrative law so thoroughly) and Matthew Warren, Student
Author, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the Development of the Hard Look

Doctrine, 90 Geo. L.J. 2599, 2618-19 (2002) (describing Judge Bazelon's prickly
personality, his ability to alienate even his ideological allies, and his penchant for asking
hard questions).
61. David L. Bazelon, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir., Memo. to George E.
MacKinnon, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir. (Oct. 7, 1976) (indicating that a copy
went to Judge Wright, and characterizing this part of Judge MacKinnon's draft as
"misleading and unfair") [DLB-BLL/43].
62. Id.

63. David L. Bazelon, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir., Memo. to J. Skelly Wright,
Carl E. McGowan, Edward Allen Tamm, Harold Leventhal, Spottswood W. Robinson, III,
George E. MacKinnon, Roger Robb & Malcolm R. Wilkey, JJ., U.S. Ct. of App. for the
D.C Cir. (Oct. 27, 1976) [DLB-BLL/43] (discussing the proposed MacKinnon dissent and
asserting that "[a] court cannot function if its members refuse to respect the rule of
confidentiality shielding conferences, memoranda, and preliminary drafts of opinions from
public disclosure"); David L. Bazelon, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir., Memo. to J.
Skelly Wright, Carl E. McGowan, Edward Allen Tamm, Harold Leventhal, Spottswood W.
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MacKinnon's actions angered not only Judge Bazelon and Judge
Wright, but also several other judges, and he eventually relented
by removing the deleted Bazelon paragraphs from his published
dissent.
DeCoster II worried several state attorneys general as well
as the Justice Department.64 If it remained as issued, there was
an argument that the district courts would be flooded with
appeals based on ineffective assistance of counsel, which would
lead to multiple trials within appeals. 65 The D.C. Circuit granted
en banc review, and its plurality opinion rejected DeCoster IIs
placement of the burden on the government to establish that the
allegedly ineffective assistance did not adversely affect the
outcome of the trial.6 6
Judge Leventhal encouraged a unanimous vote for an en
banc review, arguing that if DeCosterII were followed by other
courts, it would "move this country from an adversary to an
inquisitorial system."67 While Judge Leventhal was in the
process of lobbying for a unanimous agreement for en banc
review, Judge Bazelon kept the court abreast of DeCoster's
defense counsel's reputation. "I cannot resist sharing with you a
strikingly apposite series of events which, to me, illustrate the
heart of the Decoster problem," Judge Bazelon wrote to the
court, informing the judges that the attorney was undergoing
disbarment proceedings and had been disciplined in the past. 68
Robinson, III, George E. MacKinnon, Roger Robb & Malcolm R. Wilkey, JJ., U.S. Ct. of
App. for the D.C Cir. (Nov. 1, 1976) (delaying publication of opinions in DeCoster II until
after Judge MacKinnon replied to the Bazelon memo of October 27, or the Judicial Council
took action on the matter) [DLB-BLL/43].
64. Harold Leventhal, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir., Memo. to All Circuit
Judges (Dec. 29, 1976) (suggesting the possibility of inviting "the D.C. Bar," the "Public
Defender Service," the "Criminal Justice Section of the ABA," and perhaps other similar
organizations to appear as amici) [DLB-BLL/43].
65. Id. (citing U.S. v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
66. DeCoster III, 624 F.2d 196.

67. Leventhal, supra n. 64.
68. David L. Bazelon, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir., Memo. to the Circuit (June
19, 1976) [HL/1 12 f-lI]. Judge Bazelon continued by noting that
[t]hree months after Decoster's trial, Decoster's lawyer was appointed to
represent another indigent defendant, Samuel Saunders. Saunders was accused
of purse snatching. He was black, of low intelligence, and half-blind. The police
report of the incident described a robber who did not wear eye glasses. Saunders
wears very noticeable eye glasses with trifocal lens. Saunders protested his
innocence, and asserted that he had been working on the day of the robbery,
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Judge Leventhal believed that Judges Bazelon and Wright
had ignored the ABA's and the D.C. Bar Association's concerns
about DeCoster I.69 Yet this is not to state that Judge Leventhal
agreed with Judge MacKinnon either. Indeed, he wrote to Judge
McGowan that
[t]o the extent that he does analyze the "violation of a
substantial duty" portion of his approach, Judge
MacKinnon's argument pretty much comes down to the
proposition that DeCoster was so darned guilty, nothing his
counsel could have done would have helped; thus counsel
was under no obligation to do anything. 70
As a result, Judge Leventhal believed that he had to find a
middle ground between Judge Bazelon and Judge MacKinnon,
and he succeeded in obtaining a plurality to do so.
The plurality recognized that there was little uniformity
among the courts of appeal as to whether the government or the
appellant had the burden of proving that the ineffective
assistance did not materially alter the outcome of the trial to the
appellant's detriment.71 The plurality also emphasized that its
decisions made no equating of federal courts reviewing state

though he could not exactly remember where. He stated that the US
Employment Service would know the details. But Saunders had a prior record,
and Decoster's lawyer evidently did not believe his alibi. Decoster's lawyer did
no investigation whatever, and his defense consisted of Decoster's denial.
Saunders of course was convicted. On appeal, indisputable documentary proof
was revealed indicating that Saunders had been working on a Washington Star
delivery truck during the entire portion of the crime. The district court granted a
Rule 33 motion for a new trial and charges were dropped. In the meantime,
Saunders had spent a year and a half in jail. Decoster's lawyer was
publiclyreprimanded in an unrelated civil case in Virginia in 1975.
Id.

69. The ABA leadership had concluded that DeCoster II would cause prosecutors to
inquire into the effectiveness of defense counsel as well as to attempt to learn the thought
processes underlying the choices made while pursuing a defense. Leventhal, supra n. 64
(expressing concern that the change would lead to an "inquisitorial system" and noting that
the court might wish to hear from the ABA and various other lawyers' groups in
connection with the case). Clearly, if true, this would create a breach of the attorney-client
relationship.
70. Harold Leventhal, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir., Memo. to Carl E.
McGowan, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the D.C. Cir. (n.d.) [HLIl 12 f-1].
71. DeCoster III, 624 F.2d at 202-04.
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convictions on collateral attack, because such cases arising from
state courts had to first prove an "exceptional circumstance." 72
In DeCoster III, the plurality established a four-part test for
determining whether a reversal for ineffective assistance was
required: An appellant first had to specify overt acts or
omissions, had to prove that the acts or omissions were a
substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of
competent counsel, and had to prove that the acts and omissions
caused prejudice because they affected the outcome, but then
the government could rebut the appellant's assertions by proving
that there was no prejudice.
IV. STRICKLAND'S ROUTE TO THE BURGER COURT:
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Washington and an accomplice murdered Daniel Pridgen
and stole various items from his home. Three days later,
Washington murdered Katrina Birk-and attempted to murder
three other women-while burglarizing her home. Four days
later, Washington and two associates conspired to kidnap Frank
Meli for ransom, and then Washington murdered Meli. Learning
that his associates had been arrested, Washington surrendered to
the police and confessed to the murders and to his other

crimes. 7
After the arrest, but before the confession, Tunkey,
Washington's appointed counsel, advised him against speaking
with law-enforcement authorities, but Washington confessed

72. Id. at 207-08. The Court would in Strickland expressly reject the view that it was
issuing anything but a universal standard of review, applicable to the state courts as well as
the federal courts. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697-98 (holding that "[tuhe principles governing
ineffectiveness claims should apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct
appeal or in motions for a new trial," and that "no special standards ought to apply to
ineffectiveness claims made in habeas proceedings").
73. DeCoster III, 624 F.2d at 208 (listing components of test, and stating that "the
accused must bear the initial burden of demonstrating a likelihood that counsel's
inadequacy affected the outcome of the trial"); see also U.S. v. Green, 680 F.2d 183, 188
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (pointing out that "the accused, though ineffectively represented, must
further show a likelihood of harm therefrom, and . . . only then does the government face
the need to disprove actual injury" (quoting U.S. v. Wood, 628 F.2d 554, 561 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (Robinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
74. Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1978).
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even so.7 Washington also pled guilty against Tunkey's
advice.76 At trial, Washington waived his right to a jury and
Tunkey focused the sentencing case on Washington's guilty plea
and his acknowledgement of wrongdoing,7 but the trial judge
sentenced Washington to death nonetheless.
Washington did not challenge Tunkey's effectiveness on
his first appeal. After losing at the Florida Supreme Court, he
filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court,
which denied it.7 8
Washington's motion in the trial court for post-conviction
relief was denied, but he alleged on appeal to the Florida
Supreme Court that Tunkey had been ineffective for failing to
seek a continuance after the guilty plea, failing to request a
psychiatric report, failing to independently investigate the
government's allegations, failing to produce character witnesses
for mitigation, failing to request a presentencing report, failing
to argue effectively to the judge, and failing to investigate the
medical examiner's report or cross-examine the examiner, who
testified as to the pain Washington caused Pridgen, Birk, and
Meli.79 Many of Washington's allegations about Tunkey's lack
of preparation were true, but the Florida Supreme Court
determined that none of Tunkey's alleged failings prejudiced
Washington, as the result of the trial would have been the same
even had Tunkey been an effective advocate.8 0
75. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1247 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (per
curiam), reversed,466 U.S. 668 (1984).
76. Id.
77. Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 887 (5th Cir. 1982); see also id. at 886-89
(summarizing Tunkey's later testimony about his representation of Washington).
78. Washington v. Fla., 441 U.S. 937 (1979) (denying certiorari). Justices Brennan and
Marshall dissented on the ground that "the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id.
79. Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285, 286-87 (Fla. 1981).
80. Id. The Court held that
[a] confession plus numerous aggravating factors limit the alternatives of the
most zealous of advocates. Finally, counsel's failure to investigate medical
reports and cross-examine the medical examiners could not be prejudicial since
the facts of the reports were admitted by defendant in his confession. Under the
circumstances cross-examination could have accomplished little. Indeed, crossexamination is a trial tactic choice properly within counsel's discretion.
Id. (citations omitted). Importantly, the Florida Supreme Court relied on Knight v. State,
394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981), which essentially adopted the four-part test articulated in
DeCosterIII.
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Washington next filed a habeas petition in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, arguing that
Tunkey's performance at sentencing was so ineffective that it
constituted a denial of counsel. But the court denied the petition,
measuring Tunkey's performance against the standard
articulated in DeCosterIII and Knight.8'
Washington appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which concluded
that the district court had applied the wrong standard for
measuring effectiveness,82 noting that Tunkey testified in the
habeas hearing that after Washington confessed to his role in the
three murders and determined to plead guilty, he did not feel
"that there was anything which [he] could do which was going
to save David Washington from his fate." 83 Indeed, "[i]n the
weeks preceding the sentencing hearing, Tunkey in fact did very
little in the way of investigation or preparation," and later
admitted to not pursuing a psychiatric evaluation for
Washington, even though he had argued to the trial judge in
sentencing that Washington was laboring under mental strain at
the time of murders. In essence, Tunkey conceded that since
there was little he could do under the circumstances of
Washington's confession and the other strengths of the
government's case, he did very little on behalf of Washington. 84
It troubled the Fifth Circuit that several people, including church

81. Strickland, 673 F.2d at 901 (noting that the trial court had held that Washington had
failed to show prejudice and that, "in so concluding, the district court was, apparently,
borrowing from the analysis employed in Knight and DeCoster which require that a
petitioner carry the burden of demonstrating 'a likelihood that the deficient conduct
affected the outcome of the court proceedings"'). The state trial judge who sentenced
Washington to death testified at the habeas hearing that the sentence would not have been
affected by the introduction of character evidence or other mitigative evidence. Id. at 889.
But it bears noting that the Fifth Circuit held that on remand, the district court would have
to ignore the trial judge's testimony, because such testimony was customarily inadmissible.
Id. at 902-06 (reviewing precedents and history).
82. Id. at 882, 901-02 (noting that the trial court used "a method of analysis ... that is
different in material respects from that employed in this circuit" and concluding that
"although a habeas petitioner seeking relief on the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel must generally make a showing of prejudice, this prejudice requirement is
satisfied by demonstrating that but for his counsel's ineffectiveness his trial, but not
necessarily its outcome, would have been altered in a way helpful to him"). The panel
consisted of Judges Vance and Randall, both Carter appointees, and Judge Roney, a Nixon
appointee, who filed a dissent.
83. 673 F.2d at 886.
84. Id.
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officials, attested at the habeas hearing to Washington's
character for peacefulness, but Tunkey never made any effort to
produce these people for trial. 85 Moreover, Tunkey testified that
he could not remember whether he had read the state
psychiatrist's report of the examination conducted shortly after
Washington's arrest. 86
In 1974, the Fifth Circuit had adopted a standard for
assessing the effectiveness of counsel as "not errorless counsel,
and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel
reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective
assistance." 87 In rejecting DeCosterIIs test, the majority noted
that it would leave the reviewing courts in the position of taking
the place of the trial court's fact-finding function, and in the
panel's opinion, reviewing courts could not, by their nature,
accurately accomplish this.8 8 Applying the "reasonably
effective" standard instead, the Fifth Circuit determined that
some showing of prejudice was required, but because there was
a clear deficiency in Tunkey's representation, it would be
improper and unfair to make Washington prove that a different
outcome was likely. 89 Thus, the court applied Chapman and held
that a remand was required to determine whether Tunkey was
ineffective, and if so, whether effective counsel would have
altered the trial in any way helpful to Washington, regardless of
the outcome.
On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit's Unit B (then soon
to become the new Eleventh Circuit) granted the motion and
affirmed that, in the Fifth Circuit, an appellant claiming
ineffective assistance bore the burden of proving that defense

85. Id. at 887-88. In addition to the president of Washington's Baptist church, a police
officer provided an affidavit on Washington's behalf Id. at 888 n. 4.
86. Id. at 888-89.
87. Herringv. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 127 (5th Cir. 1974).
88. Strickland, 673 F.2d at 901 (holding that the DeCoster test "would inevitably
require us, in determining whether the petitioner has made out a prima facie case for
habeas relief, to engage in . . . highly speculative re-creations and revisions of trial court
proceedings," which "is to be avoided rather than embraced").
89. Id. ("To require a petitioner to establish a likelihood that the outcome of criminal
proceedings would have been altered in his favor had the error not occurred would require
that the court hearing the ineffective assistance claim put itself in the place of the trial-court
factfinder in an attempt to predict with some considerable degree of accuracy what that
factfinder would have done had it been presented with different evidence.").
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counsel had fallen below being "reasonably effective." 90
Moreover, the en banc majority recognized that while the
ultimate fate of a criminal trial is decided by a trier of fact at
trial, defense counsel's failure to investigate could affect the
course of the trial to the detriment of the defendant. 9 1 The en
banc majority conceded that it is impossible to create a precise
measurement for determining the "reasonableness" of a pretrial
investigation, however, because each case possesses a differing
level of complexity. 92
Most importantly, the en banc majority, while it placed a
more difficult standard on an appellant than had the original
three-judge panel, rejected both DeCoster III and any
requirement that an appellant prove that the outcome of the trial
would have been different had the defense counsel been
effective. 93 Indeed, the en banc decision found it troubling that
while the court in one decision held that it would not require an
appellant to prove that but for the ineffective counsel a different
result would have occurred, the DeCoster III plurality precisely
placed that burden on an appellant. 94 Instead, the en banc
majority placed the initial burden on the appellant of showing a
deficiency in the defense counsel's performance, but then placed
an onus on the district court to determine whether the trial's
outcome would have been different.

90. See e.g. Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1257 (noting that "[iln this case numerous factual
issues remain to be resolved by the district court before it can be determined with certainty
whether counsel was reasonably effective").
91. Id. at 1251.
92. Id. In an attempt to ease future appellate review, the en banc majority divided
ineffective-assistance claims into five categories and discussed each separately. See id. at
1252-57.
93. Id. at 1251. The following description is helpful to understanding the middle
ground between DeCosterand the Fifth Circuit's Strickland decision:
The panel majority attempted to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of
Chapman and DeCosterby imposing upon the petitioner the burden of showing
that "but for his counsel's ineffectiveness his trial, but not necessarily its
outcome, would have been altered in a way helpful to him." . .. We are now
convinced that this standard does not represent a significant improvement upon
the Chapman standard.
Id. at 1262 (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 1261 (citing Wright v. Estelle, 571 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
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95
The en banc majority incorporated United States v. Frady
to create a middle-of-the-road burden that did not hold the
government to Chapman, but also did not require an appellant to
prove that the result of the trial would have been different. 96 In
incorporating Frady into Strickland, the court determined that
the appellant bore the burden of proving that the
"ineffectiveness of counsel resulted in actual and substantial
disadvantage to the course of his defense," 97 but acknowledged
that this was not the same burden as requiring an appellant to
prove that a different result would have occurred.9 8 The court
then concluded that a remand was necessary so that the district
court could apply the new standards. 99
Judge Tjoflat concurred in the necessity for a remand, but
believed that the majority erroneously incorporated Frady.
Instead he proposed to have each individual state establish a
threshold burden for determining prejudice.1oo His chief concern
was that the en banc decision would result in federal courts
reviewing state decisions more frequently.' 0 ' But he also
expected the outcome-determinative test to cause increased
federal-court intrusion into matters of state law, and, equally
important, to undermine the constitutional right to competent
counsel. 0 2 Thus, while Judge Tjoflat's concurrence could be
labeled conservative in the sense of his attempt to minimize

95. 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (involving jury instructions that ostensibly equated malice
with intent).
96. Id. at 170 (indicating that defendant "must shoulder the burden of showing, not
merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to
his actualand substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional
dimensions" (emphasis in original)).
97. Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1262.
98. Id. (citing McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974)).
99. Id. at 1263-64. The court held that
[o]n remand, the district court should initially determine whether Washington's
right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. If the district court finds a
violation, it should then determine whether the petitioner suffered actual and
substantial detriment to the conduct of his defense. Finally, if the petitioner
meets this twin burden, the district court must determine whether, in the context
of the entire case, the detriment suffered was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. The district court may, in its discretion, conduct further proceedings.
Id. (footnote omitted).
100. Id. at 1264-65 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 1272 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 1273 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
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federal judicial oversight of state law, he believed that the test
established by DeCoster III placed too onerous a burden on
appellants.
Judges Johnson and Anderson concurred in part, but also
dissented in part, because they believed that there was enough
evidence to sustain a finding of ineffective assistance without a
remand and that Washington had established prejudice.10 The
only purpose for a remand, as they saw it, was to permit Florida
to introduce evidence to rebut Washington's showing of
prejudice, but the strength of Washington's appeal appeared
likely to make that fruitless.1 04 Finally, Judges Roney, Fay, and
Hill dissented, on the basis that Tunkey had not been ineffective
because he had, in their estimation, made tactical decisions that
were reasonable at the time. 05
The internal deliberations in Strickland evidence the
division among the judges as to where the burden of proving
harm should be, but there was also concern that the court not
devolve into personal dissension, as had occurred in DeCoster.
Indeed, Judge Clark expressed these concerns to Judge Godbold,
writing that "most or all of the members of the court are
disturbed by our splintered resolutions of Ford and
Washington." 06 He urged Judge Godbold to lobby Judges
Vance, Tjoflat, and Johnson to join with the majorit t, even if
there were differences on the final remedy proposed.1 o And as a
show of good faith, Judge Clark withdrew a draft concurrence
and instead joined Judge Tjoflat's opinion, even though he
believed that Judge Tjoflat's proposed remedy favored
Washington more than Judge Clark had originally thought

103. Id. at 1281 (Johnson & Anderson, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
104. Id. at 1281-85.
105. See e.g. id. at 1285 (Roney, Fay & Hill, JJ., dissenting) (referring to Tunkey's
reaching "a reasoned, tactical decision as to the only course of action which he thought
could result in a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence"). Although
Judge Hill joined in this dissent, he also dissented separately. See 693 F.2d at 1288 (Hill, J.,
dissenting) (stressing that the propriety of the district court's taking of Judge Fuller's
testimony was a matter for a different proceeding because it had no bearing on the
effectiveness of Tunkey's performance as Washington's trial counsel).
106. Thomas A. Clark, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 11th Cir., Memo. to John C. Godbold,
C.J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 11th Cir. (Nov. 29, 1982) [FMJ/263].
107. Id.
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appropriate. 0 8 Nonetheless, the Strickland split was as
pronounced as the DeCoster split: Across the ideological
spectrum, there was a significant gulf among the judges as to
what constituted ineffective assistance and where the burden of
proving its effect should fall.10 (There were, to be sure,
differences of opinion regarding capital punishment as well, but
the root issue of where the line between effective and ineffective
fell permeated the discussions.)
The judges understood that the Supreme Court was likely
to grant certiorari in Strickland, and after this occurred, Judge
Vance predicted that the Court would adopt either DeCoster III
or their en banc decision, and was not confident that the
Eleventh Circuit's approach would win.110 Judge Godbold, on
the other hand, noted that the Court might even adopt the
original panel decision, which he considered "more favorable"
to convicted appellants than the en banc decision.
V: STRICKLAND AND CRONIC:
DELIBERATIONS, DEBATES, AND DECISIONS

On May 29, 1983, Justice Blackmun hand-wrote on the last
page of a preliminary memorandum prepared by one of Justice
108. Thomas A. Clark, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 11th Cir., Memo. to Robert S. Vance,
J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 11th Cir. (Nov. 29, 1982) (pointing out that "[tlhere are too
many opinions in this case") [FMJ/263].
109. Judge Roney, for example, circulated the transcript of Tunkey's testimony in the
habeas hearing to support his conclusion that Tunkey was not ineffective. Paul H. Roney,
J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the IIth Cir., Memo. to All Active Judges (except Judge Hatchett),
Re: Washington v. Strickland (Nov. 5, 1982) (indicating Judge Roney's belief that "a
decision that [Tunkey] did not make a strategy decision, or a judgment call in which his
client was involved on how he would proceed in the case would be clearly erroneous" and
also noting that Tunkey stood by the decision years later "as the correct approach")
[FMJ/263]. That memo prompted Judge Johnson to note that he found it "amazing" that he
and Judge Roney had come to "diametrically opposite conclusions regarding ... Tunkey's
decision(s)," and also to tell Judge Roney that he believed both that Tunkey's failure to
investigate had "absolutely nothing to do with trial strategy" and that "Tunkey was
ineffective in failing to prepare for the sentence hearing." Frank M. Johnson, Jr., J., U.S.
Ct. of App. for the 1 1th Cir., Ltr. to Paul H. Roney, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 11th Cir.
(Nov. 8, 1982) [FMJ/263]. Judge Johnson sent copies of this letter to the rest of the judges.

Id.
110. Robert S. Vance, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 11th Cir., Memo. to All Active and
Senior Judges (June 21, 1983) [FMJ/263].
11. John C. Godbold, C.J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 11th Cir., Ltr. to Robert S. Vance,
J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 11th Cir. (July 7, 1983) [FMJ/263].
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White's clerks:
A grant seems unavoidable, given the clear conflict & the
importance of the issues. I am unhappy about this, because
I doubt that the Court will be able to find 5 votes for any 1
standard, & the decision may create more of a muddle than
is present now. Still, it is about time the Court gave some
guidance about effective assistance claims, & the conflict
here provides the foundation for doing so. . . . I would

GRANT; if the timinf can be worked out, I would schedule
the case with Cronic. 2
Justice Blackmun's pessimism about the Court's being fractured
was a realistic assessment that reflected an increase of plurality
decisions.1 1 3 However, in this instance, it was misplaced: The
Court would find a solid majority through a series of
compromises leading to the creation of a middle standard of
review.
A. Strickland v. Washington
The Court held its conference discussions in Strickland on
the same day as its conference discussions on Cronic, and three
days after hearing argument in Strickland. Justice Blackmun's
conference notes indicate diverging views in Strickland that are
not evident in the published opinion, or even in response to the
first circulated draft.1 14
Justice Stevens believed that United States v. Agurs" 5
presented a usable model for ineffective-assistance appeals of
the type raised in Strickland, which arise through no fault of the
trial court or government, more so than for the type raised in
Cronic, which result from a judge pushing defense counsel to

112. Harry A. Blackmun, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Ann. Memo. to Byron R. White, J., S. Ct.
of the U.S. (May 29, 1983) [HAB/401]. Stuart H. Singer, who clerked for Justice White,
drafted that memo for the cert pool. Id.
113. On the increase of plurality decisions see Student Author, Plurality Decisions and
Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1127, 1135-43 (1981) (discussing potential
causes for increasing use of plurality decisions).
114. See Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Ist Draft-Strickland v.
Washington (Mar. 13, 1984) [HAB/401]. Chief Justice Burger assigned Justice O'Connor
to write in Strickland and Justice Stevens to write in Cronic.
115. 427 U.S. 97(1976).
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trial.11 6 Agurs arose from a murder trial in which the prosecution
possessed potentially exculpatory evidence-the murder
victim's criminal record and violent past-that was unknown to
the defendant." 7 The Court recognized that a prosecutor has a
constitutional duty to provide known exculpatory evidence to
the defendant prior to trial, but did not conclude that a
prosecutor's failure to provide excu latory evidence required a
reversal and retrial in all instances. 11 The Court instead created
a sliding scale in which, if a reviewing court determined that the
evidence in question was unable to overcome reasonable doubt
of guilt, that is, the evidence would not change the verdict, then
no new trial was necessary.
In the Strickland conference, according to notes made by
Justice Blackmun and Justice Brennan, Chief Justice Burger
initially disfavored creating a uniform standard, preferring that
the lower courts review each claim of ineffectiveness based on
reversible error. 11 9 In other words, Chief Justice Burger would
apply a variety of tests to assess defense counsel's omission
when, for example, the failure to object to the admissibility of a
confession would be governed by the evidentiary standards for
confessions, but the failure to discover exculpatory evidence
would be governed by the newly discovered evidence rule.
Under this proposed test, the failure to investigate for all
exculpatory or mitigating witnesses would not automatically
constitute reversible error. Instead, such a failure would place a
heightened burden on an appellant to prove how an exculpatory
witness would create reasonable doubt as to an element of an
offense. But as Justice O'Connor would point out, the Burger
method did not acknowledge that defense counsel's failure to
investigate the conditions under which a confession was taken

116. Harry A. Blackmun, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Conf. Notes-Strickland v. Washington
(Jan. 13, 1984) [HAB/40 1].
117. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 99-101.
118. Id. at 112-13 ("If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the
additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. On the other
hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively
minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.").
119. Blackmunsupran. 116.
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could be symptomatic of other deficiencies in the defense
counsel's performance.' 20
Justice Brennan also disagreed with Chief Justice Burger
urging instead that a universal test was the correct solution. 12f
Justice White concurred with Justice Brennan and called Chief
Justice Burger's approach "too lax," explaining that it would
create more problems than it solved. Justice White also pointed
out his dislike of the outcome-determinative test, noting that it
lent itself to the judge and jury having their mental processes
come under scrutiny in violation of Fayerweatherv. Ritch.122 He
also indicated, somewhat surprisingly, that DeCoster was "too
tough," and instead approved of Judge Tjoflat's Strickland
concurrence. 123
Justice Powell initially urged the Court to adopt DeCoster
III's outcome-determinative text, and Justice Rehnquist added
that "Decoster makes sense."1 24 However, Justice Rehnquist also
later agreed with Justice Stevens that Agurs presented a better
standard than DeCosterIII.125 Justice Marshall was the sole vote
to sustain the Fifth Circuit's decision, taking the position that
even the rule of the en banc decision was too onerous,
particularly in a death-penalty case.126
Following the conference, Justice O'Connor circulated her
first draft, which addressed using Tunkey's performance as an
example for how the test might be applied, a discussion
apparently missing from the conference deliberations. 12 7 Justice
120. Blackmun, supra n. 116; William J. Brennan, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Conf. Notes
(n.d.) [WJB 1:647 f-2].
121. Both Justice Brennan's and Justice Blackmun's notes following the conference
indicate that the majority of justices agreed that counsel's performance could be measured
by creating a guidepost combining McMann and the ABA's duties of counsel. Blackmun,
supra n. 116; Brennan, supra n. 120 (citing McMann and suggesting that the Court
"explain in general terms what reasonably competent counsel is-perhaps in terms of the
ABA's duties of skill, knowledge, loyalty, and diligence").
122. 195 U.S. 276, 306-08 (1904) (immunizing decisional processes from review).
123. Brennan, supra n. 120. On Justice White generally, see Henry J. Reske, Pragmatic
White Retires, ABA J. 16-18 (May 1993); Daniel C. Kramer, Justice Byron R. White:
Good Friend to Polity and Solon in The Burger Court: Politicaland Judicial Profiles 407

(Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern, eds., U. Ill. Press 1991).
124. Blackmun, supra n. 116.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See supra n. 114 (indicating that first O'Connor draft circulated on March 13,
1984). Three further drafts circulated around the Court, on March 29, May 5, and May 10,
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Marshall circulated the first draft of his dissent on May 3.128
Justice Brennan circulated a first draft of an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part on March 28.129
After reviewing Justice O'Connor's first circulated draft,
Justice Brennan informed her that he agreed with "most of the
legal analysis in [her] careful and scholarly opinion," but
remained convinced that vacating the decision below and
remanding was preferable to reversing outright.' 3 0 Justice
Brennan's difficulty with the majority's decision was not in
creating a new middle-ground standard, but the majority's
application of the test in Strickland itself. He acknowledged to
Justice O'Connor that it "might have been the case" that
Tunkey's decision "not to investigate potentially mitigating
circumstances" had been "a strategic choice," but he believed
that the record did not favor such an interpretation:
As I read this passage, it suggests at least a strong

possibility that Tunkey's decision was not the product of a
strategy, but rather of a sense of hopelessness. I do not
consider it "reasonable" for counsel in a death case to make
decisions based on a feeling of hopelessness and
frustration. Indeed, it seems to me that the worse a client's
plight, the more important it is that his lawyer acts
professionally and not on the basis of emotion. 131
Justice Brennan also pointed out that because the district
court did not "employ the Agurs standard" to analyze prejudice,
a remand was the only appropriate decision, particularly as a
majority of Justices favored the creation of an entirely new
standard. Finally, because the sentencing judge had only
Washington's apology to consider, and "had virtually no
information concerning Washington the man," there was, to
though the differences between the first and fourth draft were largely stylistic. See e.g.
William J. Brennan, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S. Ct. of
the U.S. (May 9, 1984) (suggesting possible clarification); Sandra J. O'Connor, J., S. Ct. of
the U.S., Memo. to William J. Brennan, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S. ((May 9, 1984) (agreeing
to add requested clarification) [WJB/I:647 f-I].
128. Thurgood Marshall, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Ist Draft-Stricklandv. Washington (May
3, 1984) [HAB/401].
129. William J. Brennan, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Ist Draft-Stricklandv. Washington
(March 28, 1984) [HAB/401].
130. William J. Brennan, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to Sandra Day O'Connor, J.,
S. Ct. of the U.S. (Mar. 13, 1984) [HAB/401 & WJB/I:647 f-l].
131. Id.
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Justice Brennan, more than a reasonable doubt that the outcome
would have been different had Tunkey been reasonably effective

as demanded by the new standards.' 3 2
Justice O'Connor clearly wanted Justice Brennan to join
the majority opinion, but not at the expense of applying the new
standard to the facts of the initial case. But, she noted, "[i]t is
helpful because it gives a concrete illustration of how the
otherwise abstract principles articulated in the opinion apply to
one particular set of facts." As to Justice Brennan's contention
that Tunkey's "hopelessness" rendered his performance
incompetent, Justice O'Connor responded that "if it did, any
counsel who felt hopeless about a case would have to be
disqualified." 33 On the other hand, she concluded that if she
could not muster five justices to vote for reversal, she would
revise the opinion to order a remand. 134
Justice O'Connor did not, in reality, have to wonder
whether five justices would side with her first draft opinion.
Justice Rehnquist noted his agreement, adding: "I think without
Section V, in which you apply the standards developed in the
earlier part of the opinion to the facts of this case, the opinion is
somewhat abstract and might mean a number of things to a
number of people."' 35 Chief Justice Burger also joined her draft,
stating that he saw "no need to remand"l 3 6 Justices White,

Powell, and Blackmun eventually joined Justice O'Connor's
draft as well.137 Moreover, Justice Powell agreed with Justice
Rehnquist, stating, "I think we should decide Strickland. It
would be helpful for the lower courts to have us apply the new

132. Id.
133. Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to William J. Brennan, Jr., J.,
S. Ct. of the U.S. (Mar. 13, 1984) [HAB/401 & WJB/I:647 f-I].
134. Id.
135. William H. Rehnquist, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S.
Ct. of the U.S. (Mar. 14, 1984) [HAB/401 & WJB/I:647 f-I].
136. Warren E. Burger, C.J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S.
Ct. of the U.S. (Mar. 14, 1984) [HAB/401].
137. Byron R. White, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S. Ct. of
the U.S. (Mar. 22, 1984) [HAB/401]; Lewis F. Powell, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to
Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S. Ct. of the U.S. (Mar. 23, 1984) [HAB/401]; Harry A.
Blackmun, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S. Ct. of the U.S.
(Mar. 26,1984) [HAB/401].
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Justice Powell also differentiated Cronic from
Strickland with the caveat that he favored a remand in Cronic.
This left only Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall not in favor
of Justice O'Connor's circulated draft.
On March 22, Justice Stevens informed Justice O'Connor
that he favored a remand even though she had "written an
excellent opinion."' 39 Had Justice Stevens maintained his
posture on the issue of a remand, he would have joined with
Justice Brennan. But on March 28, Justice Stevens switched his
position on both the remand and the aplication of the new
standard, and decided to join the majority. o
Although Justice Brennan intended to concur, his influence
over the majority did not end after Justice O'Connor's third
draft. Following Justice Marshall's circulated dissent, Justice
Brennan noted to Justice O'Connor that the draft majority
opinion could be interpreted as directing state and federal
appellate courts to "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance."1 4 1 This caused Justice O'Connor to add language
regarding the influence of the ABA standards.14 2
The final opinion first provided an overview of
Washington's trial and appeals history, noting that the sole
reason for granting certiorari was to "consider the standards by
which to judge a contention that the Constitution requires that a
criminal judgment be overturned because of the actual
ineffective assistance of counsel."1 43 Then the Court reaffirmed
the principle that the right to counsel is an essential component
of the right to a fair trial.144
standards."l

38

138. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S.
Ct. of the U.S. (Mar. 23, 1984) [HAB/401, WJB/I:647 f-I].
139. John Paul Stevens, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S. Ct.
of the U.S. (Mar. 22, 1984) [HAB/401, WJB/I:647 f-I].
140. John Paul Stevens, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S. Ct.
of the U.S. (Mar. 28, 1984) [HAB/401].
141. William J. Brennan, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to Sandra Day O'Connor, J.,
S. Ct. of the U.S., Re: Strickland v. Washington (May 9, 1984) (emphasis in original)
[WJB/I:647f-2].
142. Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to William J. Brennan, Jr., J.,
S. Ct. of the U.S., Re: Strickland v. Washington (May 9, 1984) [WJB/I:647f-2].
143. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 462 U.S. 1105 (1983)

(granting certiorari)).
144. Id. (citing both Powell and Gideon).
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In the opinion's third section, the Court held that it was not
in the interests of a fair trial to create specific guidelines for
measuring the effectiveness of counsel,145 and declined to adopt
the ABA guidelines as the sole determinant of effectiveness:
Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar
Association standards and the like . . . are guides to

determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides.
No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances
faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate
decisions re arding how best to represent a criminal
defendant.14
Essentially an adoption of DeCoster III, this part of the opinion
indicated the plurality's belief that defined rules would hinder
the performance of defense counsel by creating restrictions on
"the wide latitude counsel must have for making tactical
decisions."1 4 7 The Court also recognized that strict adherence to
ABA-issued rules would also enable the ABA to shape appellate
practice at the expense of judicial discretion.148 Nonetheless, the
Court did not seek to diminish the ABA's role in regulating the
practice of law by defense counsel.
The Court also recognized that with the absence of specific
guidelines to measure effectiveness, courts had to udge whether
counsel was ineffective on a case-by-case basis 14 because even
unreasonable errors require reversal only if they are prejudicial.
Distinguishing Cronic, the Court then held that it would be
improper to require the government to prove prejudice when
neither its actions nor those of the court created the error. so
145. Id. at 688 (pointing out that "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms" and noting in addition that
"[miore specific guidelines are not appropriate").
146. Id. at 688-89.
147. Id. at 689 (citing DeCoster III).
148. Id. at 689 (noting that "[t]he availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney
performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation
of ineffectiveness challenges," and pointing out that "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential" because "it is all too easy for a court, examining
counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or
omission of counsel was unreasonable").
149. Id. at 690 (referring to "the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of
counsel's conduct").
150. Id. at 692-93.
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that DeCoster III's

outcome-determinative test possessed several strengths, it found

the test to be unreasonable. 1 The Court then concluded that a
single standard of review was the only means for assuring

uniform fairness.152 In doing so, it rejected Judge Tjoflat's
position that states should be permitted to create their own
standards.
With the exception of Justice Marshall, who dissented from
any departure from the en banc Eleventh Circuit, the last section
of the majority decision generated the most disagreement among
the justices. Justice Brennan ultimately concurred in the
standards for reviewing appeals,' 53 but believed that Tunkey was
ineffective under the new standards and that the resulting
prejudice required reversal of the death sentence. 154 The
remaining seven Justices were split as to whether the Court
could apply the new standards or should remand Washington's
case for application of the new standards in the district court.
Justice O'Connor considered that both sides on this issue had
merit.15 5 However, a majority of the remaining Justicesincluding Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Rehnquist, and Powell-wanted to evaluate Washington's
claims of ineffective assistance by the new standards. 156
Finally, the Court concluded that Tunkey had made a
strategic choice to focus on Washington's emotional distress at
the time of his offenses and also assumed that by pleading guilty
Washington would receive leniency.15 7 The majority then
151. Id. at 694 (noting that "the standard is not quite appropriate").
152. Id. at 695 (acknowledging that "[t]he governing legal standard plays a critical role
in defining the question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from counsel's errors").
153. Id. at 702 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting) ("I join the Court's opinion
because I believe that the standards it sets out today will both provide helpful guidance to
courts considering claims of actual ineffectiveness of counsel and also permit those courts
to continue their efforts to achieve progressive development of this area of the law.").
154. Id. at 701 (Brennan J., concurring & dissenting) ("Adhering to my view that the
death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments,... I would vacate respondent's death sentence and remand
the case for further proceedings.") (citation omitted); see also Blackmun, supra n. 116
(indicating both that Justice Brennan believed Tunkey's errors to have affected the
outcome in Washington's case and that he would reverse the death sentence).
155. Blackmun, supra n. 116.
156. Id.
157. Strickland,466 U.S. at 698-99.
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determined that Tunkey's strategic choices were reasonable and
in the alternative Washington was not prejudiced by any
deficiency. Had Tunkey provided psychiatric testimony, the
majority noted, the prosecution would have been able to present
evidence of Washington's prior criminal record.1 18 As a result,
the Court concluded that Washington's sentencing proceeding
had not been inherently unfair. The majority may have been
correct in finding that Washington did not suffer any prejudice
by Tunkey's decisions: Following the reinstatement of the death
penalty, Florida sentenced several people to death, and
Washington's conduct was egregious. 9 On the other hand,
Tunkey's pre-sentencing investigation did not appear to be
thorough, even by his own admission. The question of whether
Tunkey's pre-sentencing investigation was adequate would be a
contested issue in the conference.
Like Judges Johnson, Anderson, Vance, and Randall,
Justice Brennan believed that Tunkey had been ineffective, and
that the ineffectiveness had prejudiced Washington. However,
he urged a remand on the ground that because of the severe
nature of death-penalty proceedings, a trial court would be in a
better position to determine whether there was prejudice.160
Justice Marshall dissented in part because he believed that
the Fifth Circuit's standard was appropriate, but also because he
disagreed with the Court's refusal to articulate guidelines
instead offering courts and lawyers relatively general advice.16f
Justice Marshall conceded that the decision would bring
uniformity to the review of ineffective-assistance claims, but at
too high a bar for convicted appellants to clear.' 62
B. United States v. Cronic
Unlike Strickland, which originated in a state capital-

158. Id. at 699-70.
159. Id. at 699 (calling the aggravating circumstances here "utterly overwhelming").
160. Id. at 706.
161. Id. at 706-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 710 ("In view of all these impediments to a fair evaluation of the probability
that the outcome of a trial was affected by ineffectiveness of counsel, it seems to me
senseless to impose on a defendant whose lawyer has been shown to have been
incompetent the burden of demonstrating prejudice.") (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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murder trial, United States v. Cronic arose from a federal fraud
triall 63 in which Cronic and two co-defendants were prosecuted
for conspiring to commit mail fraud and for the use of a
fictitious name, both in a large-scale check-kiting scheme. His
two co-defendants pled guilty, but Cronic litigated his case. He
was defended by a court-appointed attorney who specialized in
real-estate law and had only once defended a person charged
with a crime. The defense counsel's strategy, when confronted
with thousands of bank documents, was to try to undermine the
government's ability to meet its burden of proof, and urge the
jury to consider that overdrafts were a commonplace part of
banking practices. Prior to trial, Cronic's defense counsel asked
for a thirty-day continuance, but the trial court granted him
twenty-five days to prepare for trial.'1 A prior defense counsel
who had been a United States Attorney had recommended thirty
days, and Cronic had, to no avail, sought a second, more
experienced counsel. 6 5
In Dyer v. Crisp,'6 6 the Tenth Circuit rejected the farceand-mockery standard for one based on reasonably competent
counsel. In order to prevail under this standard, the convicted
appellant had to show prejudice. However, shortly after Dyer,
the Tenth Circuit created an exception to this requirement: In
both United States v. King 67 and United States v. Golub,168 the

163. 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
164. Id. at 1129 n. 1.
165. Id. It is unclear why Cronic's prior counsel did not remain on the case, but in any
event, Cronic was found guilty at trial and sentenced to twenty-five years. See Cronic, 466
U.S. at 650.
166. 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that "[t]he Sixth Amendment demands
that defense counsel exercise the skill, judgment and diligence of a reasonably competent
defense attorney").
167. 664 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1981). King arose from a judge's refusal to grant a
continuance to replacement counsel in a complicated tax-fraud trial. The Tenth Circuit
considered the insufficient preparation time a "court-induced lack of preparation." Id. at
1173.
168. 638 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1980). Golub arose from a lawyer's having five days to
prepare to defend against a complex mail-fraud case. Golub's attorney was a retired lawyer
who had not defended a client in a criminal trial in over twenty years, had unsuccessfully
sought more time to prepare, and was unable to interview the government's out-of-state
witnesses prior to trial. Id. at 187. In Golub, the court created the following ineffectiveassistance test: (1) the time afforded for investigation and preparation; (2) the experience of
counsel; (3) the gravity of the charge; (4) the complexity of possible defenses; and (5) the
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court determined that in instances in which the prosecution or
judge created circumstances that hampered the performance of
defense counsel, an appellant need not prove prejudice. And the
Cronic court itself noted that "Cronic's case was not an ideal
one for an aspiring criminal defense lawyer to cut his teeth on,"
and vacated the conviction.' 6 9 The government sought certiorari.
The Court issued Cronic on the same day as Strickland, but
remanded Cronic, which appears to have been an almost
unanimous decision other than Justice Marshall's concurrence.
The Justices' papers, though, reveal several disagreements in
conference, similar to the disagreements in Strickland. The
Court ultimately determined that even where the ineffectiveness
was alleged to have been caused by the trial judge, a reviewing
court must still find prejudice because not every refusal to grant
a continuance would give rise to the presumption of prejudice.1 70
The Court was also unwilling to create a rule that twentyfive days to prepare for trial was too short to ensure for effective
trial representation.' 7' But the Court did not criticize the Tenth
Circuit's test for ineffectiveness; instead it criticized the Tenth
Circuit's coupling of Powell to Cronic's appeal insofar as
Cronic did not have to show prejudice. The Court did not object
to a test that presumed prejudice, but in such instances, the
Justices wanted petitioners to point to counsel's specific
omissions or deficiencies.' 72
In conference, Chief Justice Burger called Cronic's "a
phony claim," by which Cronic could not demonstrate any

accessibility of witnesses to counsel. Id. at 189. This test would be used by the Tenth
Circuit in Cronic.
169. Cronic, 675 F.2d at 1129.
170. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 661-62.
171. Id. at 664-65.
172. Id. at 666. The Court held that the case was "not one in which the surrounding
circumstances make it unlikely that the defendant could have received the effective
assistance of counsel," noting that "[tihe criteria used by the Court of Appeals do not
demonstrate that counsel failed to function in any meaningful sense as the Government's
adversary," and concluding that Cronic could have made out a claim of ineffective
assistance "only by pointing to specific errors made by trial counsel." Id. Acknowledging
that Cronic's counsel in the Supreme Court took the position "that the record would
support such an attack," the Court nonetheless decided to "leave that claim-as well as the
other alleged trial errors raised by respondent which were not passed upon by the Court of
Appeals-for the consideration of the Court of Appeals on remand." Id. at 666-67.
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prejudice, because there simply was none. 173 Justice Brennan
countered that the trial court had itself placed conditions on the
defense counsel, which, given the counsel's lack of experience,
created a situation in which Cronic "had no counsel at all." 174
Justice White urged that as a result of the trial judge's action
Powell provided a better basis for decision than Strickland.17
Justice Powell sided somewhat with Justice White but wanted to
insure that whatever standard the Court created, it did not
encompass a presumption that new lawyers were incompetent,
commenting that "new lawyers do well."I 76 He also informed
Justices O'Connor and Stevens that, while he did not believe
that a remand in Strickland was necessary, he thought one
necessary in Cronic.77 Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens
agreed with Justice Powell on this point, trying to ensure that the
opinion recognized that defense counsel had "broad
discretion." 7 8 In principle Justice O'Connor accepted all but
Chief Justice Burger's position, and ultimately even he joined
the majority. Only Justice Marshall, who had dissented in
Strickland, opted to concur in the judgment.' 79
Justice Brennan differentiated Cronic from Strickland
because in Cronic the trial court had a role in pressing defense
counsel to trial when he claimed that he was not ready, and in
Strickland, the trial court had no such role.' 8 0 Nonetheless, to
Justice Brennan, and the unanimous court, what had occurred in
Cronic did not necessitate overturning a conviction without any
showing of prejudice.1'8 Unlike Chief Justice Burger and Justice
O'Connor, though, Justice Brennan believed that there were two
categories of ineffective-assistance claims that required no

173. William J. Brennan, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Conf. Notes (n.d.) [WJB/I:638].
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to Sandra Day O'Connor & John
Paul Stevens, JJ., S. Ct. of the U.S. (Mar. 23, 1984) [WJB/I:638].
178. Id.
179. Harry A. Blackmun, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Conf. Notes-U.S. v. Cronic (June 13,
1984) [HAB/394]; Thurgood Marshall, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to John Paul Stevens,
J., S. Ct. of the U.S. (May 11, 1984) [WJB/I:638].
180. William J. Brennan, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Bench Memo.-Strickland v. Wash.
(n.d.) [WJB/1:638].
181. Id.
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showing of prejudice: those stemming from egregious judicial or
government conduct or from truly incompetent counsel. 182

VI: THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH

OF STRICKLAND

A. Strickland'sProgeny: 1984-1986
Between Strickland and the end of Chief Justice Burger's
tenure, several ineffective-assistance cases came to the Court. 8 3
182. William J. Brennan, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Bench Memo.-U.S. v Cronic (n.d.).
Justice Brennan expanded on this point:
In my view, there are only two circumstances in which a court addressing a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can dispense with any inquiry into
prejudice: (1) The first circumstance is when a state authority-either the
prosecutor or the judge-fundamentally impairs counsel's ability to do his job.
This type of claim includes cases ranging from outright denial of counsel
(Gideon) to prohibiting counsel-client consultations (Geders, 1976) to barring a
summation (Brooks, 1972) to appointing counsel a few minutes before trial
(Powell v. Alabama). In none of our cases of this type have we required a
showing of prejudice. (2) The second type of claim in which no prejudice need
be shown is when counsel's own conduct is so ineffective that the defendant
constructively has no counsel at all, such as, for instance, when counsel sits on
his hands and does absolutely nothing.
Id.
183. Justice O'Connor circulated several memoranda during this period in which she
recommended action on cases to be remanded for consideration in light of Strickland and
those on which the Court should simply pass. See Sandra J. O'Connor, J., S. Ct. of the
U.S., Memo. to the Conf. Re: Case Held for Strickland v. Washington-Stanley v. Zant
(capital case) (May 14, 1984) [HAB/401]; Memo. to the Conf. Re: Case Held for
Strickland v. Washington-Wainwright v. Douglas (capital case) (May 14, 1984)
[HAB/401]; Memo. to the Conf. Re: Case Held for Strickland v. Washington-Douglasv.
Wainwright (capital case) (May 14, 1984) [HAB/401]; Memo. to the Conf. Re: Case Held
for Strickland v. Washington-Foster v. Lankford, supra n. 6; Memo. to the Conf. Re:
Case Held for Strickland v. Washington-Solem v. Lulkins (May 14, 1984) [HAB/401];
Memo. to the Conf. Re: Case Held for Strickland v. Washington-Johnson v. McKaskle
(May 14, 1984) [HAB/401]; Memo. to the Conf. Re: Case Held for Strickland v.
Washington-Stafford v. Oklahoma (May 14, 1984) [HAB/401]; Memo. to the Conf. Re:
Case Held for Strickland v. Washington-Strickland v. King (capital case) (May 14, 1984)
[HAB/401]; Memo. to the Conf. Re: Case Held for Strickland v. Washington-Berryhillv.
Francis (capital case) (May 14, 1984) [HAB/401]; Memo. to the Conf. Re: Case Held for
Strickland v. Washington-Stafford v. Oklahoma (capital case) (May 14, 1984) (involving
second unrelated murder conviction) [HAB/401]; Memo. to the Conf. Re: Case Held for
Strickland v. Washington-Burger v. Zant (capital case) (May 14, 1984) [HAB/401];
Memo. to the Conf. Re: Case Held for Strickland v. Washington-Strickland v. King

(capital case) (May 21, 1984) [HAB/401]. Justice Stevens circulated a responsive
memorandum highlighting points on which he disagreed with Justice O'Connor. See John
Paul Stevens, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to the Conf. Re: Cases Held for United States v.
Cronic and Cases Held for Strickland v. Washington (May 18, 1984) [HAB/40 1]. And then
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Those in which the Court granted certiorari are divisible into
three categories: claims originating from counsel's errors in
trial; questions about the extent to which Strickland applied to
appellate counsel; and the extent to which Strickland applied to
the rule of procedural default.184
1. Ineffectiveness Claims Stemmingfrom Trials
Two years after Strickland, in Nix v. Whiteside,1's the Court
determined that when defense counsel refuses to cooperate with
a defendant during the commission of perjury, counsel is not
ineffective. While Nix reaffirmed defense counsel's duty of
loyalty, that duty was limited to lawful conduct, and both the
ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
relevant state rules prohibited counsel from participating in a
Justice O'Connor circulated a second series of memoranda explaining her position in each
case about which they differed. See Sandra J. O'Connor, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to
the Conf. Re: Case Held for Strickland v. Washington-Wainwright v. Douglas (capital
case) (May 21, 1984) [HAB/401]; Sandra J. O'Connor, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to the
Conf. Re: Case Held for Strickland v. Washington-Stanley v. Zant (capital case) (May 21,
1984) [HAB/401]. Because several state attorneys general and the Justice Department were
concerned about whether the Court would create a standard in Strickland that would apply
only prospectively, these discussions of remands and denials of certiorari were particularly
important. See e.g. Amicus CuriaeBr. of the States ofAla., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., et al., in
Support ofPetrs., Strickland v. Washington, 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 532 at LEXIS
p. 2 ("[T]he analysis provided by this Court will bear on cases in which state courts have
already reviewed and rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . [and] much
time will have elapsed since the convictions. Because these claims are tardy and
speculative, they threaten the integrity of our entire criminal justice system, raising the
possibility that such claims will materialize in every case in which a conviction has
occurred.").
184. In order to obtain review for procedural default, a petitioner must show that the
omission by defense counsel would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, and that
the petition is not an abuse of habeas. See e.g. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95
(1991) (holding that "petitioner's opportunity to meet the burden of cause and prejudice
will not include an evidentiary hearing if the district court determines as a matter of law
that petitioner cannot satisfy the standard," but also holding that "[i]f petitioner cannot
show cause, the failure to raise the claim in an earlier petition may nonetheless be excused
if he or she can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure
to entertain the claim"). At the time of Strickland, the law on procedural default was
defined by Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S 107 (1982), in which the Court essentially held that a
defendant is entitled to competent, rather than perfect, defense counsel and to a fair trial.
Id. at 134 (acknowledging that competence will "not insure that defense counsel will
recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional claim"). The extent to which
Strickland modified Engle was an open question in the aftermath of Strickland.
185. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
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client's perjury or presentation of false evidence.1 86 The Eighth
Circuit had held that even though the defendant had committed
perjury, counsel's efforts to persuade the defendant against
committing perjury were improper, because the threat to inform
the trial court of the intended perjury and the threat to withdraw
from representation made the defendant choose not to testify. 8 7
But as the right to testify does not encompass the right to testify
falsely, the Court found that counsel was not ineffective. 8 8
In conference, Chief Justice Burger asserted that the ABA
standards were, by implication, at issue in Nix, and that it was
important for the Court to give these standards maximum
deference.1 89 Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens urged
that the Court simply rule on the basis that because defense
counsel's advice to a client not to commit perjury and refusal to
participate in perjury is consistent with acting in the client's best
interest, there simply could be no prejudice.' 90 Justice Brennan
later added in a memorandum circulated to Justice Stevens and
Justice Blackmun that, while recognizing "there is, of course, no
right to perjure oneself," he did not think that the Court "should
constitutionalize legal ethics."'91 Justice White disagreed and
urged Chief Justice Burger to approach the appeal by excepting
ethical obligations of counsel from the Strickland test
altogether.192 Justices O'Connor, Powell, and Rehnquist agreed
with Chief Justice Burger's approach as well.' 93
Justice Blackmun's concurrence reflected the view he
expressed at the conference discussions by agreeing that
186. Id. at 168 (quoting rule and citing Comm. on Prof Ethics & Conduct of Iowa St.
BarAssn. v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976)).

187. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1329 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting that "[clounsel's
actions, in particular the threat to testify against appellant, indicate that a conflict of interest
had developed between counsel and appellant," and that "counsel had become a potential
adversary and ceased to serve as a zealous advocate of appellant's interests"), rev'd sub
nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).

188. Nix, 475 U.S. at 173.
189. Harry A. Blackmun, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Conf. Notes-Nix v. Whiteside (Nov. 8,
1985) [HAB/441].
190. Id
191. William J. Brennan, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Bench Memo.-Nix v. Whiteside
(argued Nov. 5, 1985) [WJB/I:704].
192. Byron R. White, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to Warren E. Burger, C.J., S. Ct. of
the U.S. (Jan. 31, 1986) [HAB/441].
193. Blackmun, supra n. 189.
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Whiteside suffered no prejudice, but along with Justice Brennan
and Justice Stevens, he departed from the Court's use of the
ABA standards, albeit for a reason absent from the conference
discussion. Justice Blackmun urged that the Court's ruling could
evolve into usurpation of the state bars' duties of establishing
professional standards within each state.194 Justice Brennan
joined Justice Blackmun, but also concurred separately on the
basis that the Court did not possess the authority to create rules
of professional responsibility that applied in state courts.1 9 5
Justice Stevens concurred as well, to make the point that a
client's recalling events differently over time does not
automatically give rise to perjury, and that he believed the
Court's decision could be read to imply that changes in a
defendant's memory should be treated as perjury.196
While Nix appears as a fractured decision, the Court
unanimously agreed to deny certiorari in a contemporaneously
considered case. Chief Justice Burger noted that Curtis v. United
Statesl97 had been held for Nix, and the facts underlying Curtis
were fairly similar: The defendant had admitted to his counsel
that he committed an armed bank robbery but wanted to testify
and be questioned on an alibi defense. The attorney refused to
offer the testimony, and informed the defendant that he would
withdraw if the defendant testified.198 The Seventh Circuit

194. Nix, 475 U.S. at 189-90 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens JJ., concurring)
(indicating that Justice Blackmun was "troubled by the Court's implicit adoption of
standards of professional responsibility for attorneys in state criminal proceedings," and
noting that although states "have a compelling interest in the integrity of their criminal
trials that can justify regulating the length to which an attorney may go in seeking his
client's acquittal," the ABA's "implicit suggestion ... that the Court find that the ...
Model Rules of Professional Conduct should govern an attorney's responsibilities is
addressed to the wrong audience," and that "[iut is for the States to decide how attorneys
should conduct themselves in state criminal proceedings," the Supreme Court's role being
"only" to ensure "that the restrictions a State enacts do not infringe a defendant's federal
constitutional rights").
195. Id. at 177-78 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
196. Id. at 190-91 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
197. 742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1064 (1986). Justice Brennan
took no part in the denial of certiorari, but his conference notes indicate no intention of
voting for a grant. See Warren E. Burger, C.J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to the Conf. (Feb.
27, 1986) [WJB:/I:704].
198. Curtis, 742 F.2d at 1072-73.
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determined that because there was no right to testify falsely, the
sixth amendment was not implicated by counsel's actions.
In Kimmelman v. Morrison,20 0 the Court concluded that
counsel's failure to timely file a motion to suppress a confession
or evidence under either the fifth or fourth amendments could
support a finding of ineffective assistance requiring the reversal
of a conviction. The Court also concluded that the traditional
habeas test governing review of state convictions-that so long
as the state appellate courts reviewed the petitioner's claim fully
and fairly, the federal judiciary must defer to that review--did
not apply to review of petitions rooted in the sixth amendment's
right to counsel. 20 ' The question was whether the then-new
restrictions on federal habeas review of unlawful-search-andseizure claims
should be extended to . . . claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel where the principal allegation and manifestation
of inadequate representation is counsel's failure to file a
timely motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.202
According to the state, the case was just an "attempt to
litigate [a] defaulted Fourth Amendment claim." 203 But the
Court accepted the initial habeas court's conclusion that
''counsel failed to conduct any meaningful pretrial
investigation." 204 Kimmelman is important for the principle that
the paramount consideration for assessing ineffective-assistance
claims is not the nature of the underlying omission (such as a
failure to investigate a fourth amendment violation), but rather
an assessment of whether counsel truly failed to investigate and
pursue a claim. It may be that the admission of reliable, but
illegally seized, evidence did not rise to the level of prejudice in
Kimmelman, as Justice Powell pointed out. 205 However, the
Court did not address this issue, and no Justice expressed a

199. Id. at 1076 (pointing out that "a defendant has no constitutional right to testify
perjuriously in his own behalf").
200. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
201. Id. at 373-75.
202. Id. at 368.
203. Id. at 373.
204. Id. at 372.
205. Id. at 394 (Powell J., concurring).

STRICKLAND, THE BURGER COURT, AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

255

belief in conference that the defense counsel's wholesale failure
to investigate could survive the first Strickland prong.206
In Burger v. Kemp,207 the Court determined that the
appointment of two attorneys from the same firm to represent
co-defendants at a capital-murder trial, without more evidence
of a conflict, did not support a claim of ineffective assistance
based on the right to conflict-free counsel.2 0 8 The relevant facts
in Burger were that the co-defendants murdered a taxi driver,2 09
that one lawyer had prepared both appellate briefs, and that
appellate counsel did not argue on appeal that one defendantBurger-had a lesser degree of culpability, so the death penalty
was excessive.210 Burger also claimed that his attorney did not
offer a plea deal to the prosecution, which would have included
his testifying against his co-defendant.211 But the Court accepted
the finding below that a plea deal was unlikely to be accepted
because of the gravity of the crime, and concluded that even if
the omissions of counsel occurred, they did not fall outside "the
wide range of professionally competent assistance." 2 12
During conference discussions, Justice O'Connor stressed
that a vote for remand was meritorious because the lower court
did not satisfactorily articulate its reasons for concluding that an
adequate investigation had occurred. 2 13 "Whether counsel's
decisions were reasonable depends on what counsel planned to
do, as evidenced by what he actually did, at the sentencing,"
Justice O'Connor commented.2 14 Ultimately, though, Justice
O'Connor, along with the majority, determined on appeal that
there was no ineffective assistance prejudicial to Burger.
Justice Blackmun, with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Powell joining, dissented, arguing that both allegations of
206. Harry A. Blackmun, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Conf. Notes (Mar. 7, 1986) [HAB/445].

207. 483 U.S. 776 (1987). The case was originally Burger v. Zant, 718 F.2d 979 (11th
Cir. 1983).
208. Id. at 783-84.
209. Id. at 778-79.
210. Id. at 784.
211. Id. at 785 (asserting that "[tihe notion that the prosecutor would have been
receptive to a plea bargain is completely unsupported in the record").
212. Id. at 795.
213. Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to the Conf.-Burger v. Zant,
(May 15, 1984) [HAB/401].
214. Id.
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ineffectiveness were of constitutional dimension and at least
established the first part of Strickland. Petitioner Burger pointed
out that at trial, a third party who had been in the cab with the
co-defendants shortly before the murder testified that Burger had
initially opposed murdering the driver, but that his co-defendant
demanded it. 2 15 In conference, the issue of counsel's decision
not to pursue the defense of lesser culpability became a matter
of contention between Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens.
Justice Blackmun believed that Strickland coupled with Glasser
mandated reversal on a showing of a potential conflict of
interest, but Justice Stevens countered that in no drafts or
discussions did any Justice pursue such an analysis in the
Strickland deliberations. 2 16
2. Strickland and the Right to Counsel on Appeal
In Penson v. Ohio, the Court held that the right to effective
assistance of counsel applied to the first post-conviction
appeal.2 17 Penson was indigent and the state appointed appellate
counsel, who concluded that there were no errors at trial and any
appeals would be frivolous.2 18 The Ohio Court of Appeals
permitted counsel to withdraw, and did not appoint new counsel.
But during its later review of the record, that court concluded
that, contrary to counsel's assertions, Penson had several
meritorious claims that could be advanced on appeal. Indeed, the
appellate court found that the trial judge had issued erroneous

215. Burger, 483 U.S. at 800 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, & Powell, JJ., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun pointed to the actual testimony, which read:
Well, Tom Stevens said that he thought they should kill him. And, I told him I
thought he was crazy. And, Burger didn't like the idea of killing him either.
Burger said that they ought to let him go, that they ought to drive off in the
woods somewhere and let him out, and then take the car somewhere and put it
like, I think somebody mentioned the ocean.
Id.

216. Harry A. Blackmun, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Burger v. Kemp Conf. Notes (Apr. 1,
1987) [HAB/485].
217. See 488 U.S. 75 (1988). This was not a shocking decision. In Anders v. Cal., 386
U.S. 738, 744 (1967), the Court had held that the right to appellate counsel meant that
counsel had to conduct at least a "conscientious examination" of the case.
218. Penson, 488 U.S. at 78.
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jury instructions in one instance and consequently reversed one
of the petitioner's convictions.214
The Court recognized that appellate counsel had a duty not
to advance frivolous appeals, but also noted its holdings that the
right to counsel extended to the first appeal from a conviction. 22 0
The Court also held that a no-merit assertion made before
investigating the record constituted a denial of counsel, 221 and
then found prejudicial error in the state court's permitting
counsel to withdraw without appointing new counsel.2 22 The
state argued that because the appellate court itself found errors
in the petitioner's trial, the petitioner suffered no prejudice. The
Court found this argument misplaced because the appellate court
could not both conduct its function in reviewing appeals and
adopt a secondary function embracing a convicted defendant's
right to advocacy on appeal. 22 3
In conference, none of the justices urged that Strickland did
not apply to appellate counsel. To the contrary, all of the
Justices agreed that Strickland governed appellate counsel.
However, appellate counsel will often be measured on their
thorough review of trial records, as well as their adherence to the
time standards set by the appellate courts, and there was no
consensus as to whether defense counsel in Penson was
ineffective. Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that counsel was
not per se ineffective simply because he exercised his judgment
and determined that there was no basis for appeal. Justice
Brennan disagreed and urged that counsel's ineffectiveness was
shown by the action of the state appellate courts, which found on
their own that Penson could raise meritorious claims on appeal.
Justice Stevens believed that three clear errors existed, but
conceded that it would be difficult to prove prejudice. Justice
219. Id. at 79-80.
220. Id. at 79 (citing Douglas v. Cal., 372 U.S. 353 (1963)).
221. Id. (citing Anders).

222. Id. at 80 ("[I]f the court disagrees with counsel-as the Ohio Court of Appeals did
in this case-and concludes that there are nonfrivolous issues for appeal, 'it must, prior to
decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal."' (quoting
Anders)).

223. Id at 88 (pointing out that "[b]ecause the fundamental importance of the assistance
of counsel does not cease as the prosecutorial process moves from the trial to the appellate
stage, . . . the presumption of prejudice must extend as well to the denial of counsel on
appeal") (citation omitted).
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O'Connor noted that she was "no fan of Anders," but would
favor a remand. Justice Scalia urged that the Court could not
reasonably apply Strickland to Anders, and that the central issue
in Penson was whether appellate counsel had a duty to write
something on his client's behalf.224
3. Strickland and ProceduralDefault
In Murray v. Carrier225 the Court determined that because
many procedural defaults could not be classified under
Strickland, the avenues of redress for procedural default had to
be separate from those based on ineffective assistance. 226 Since
then, Strickland has been considered inapplicable where
otherwise competent defense counsel made a single mistake. 227
In the absence of a viable ineffective-assistance claim, the Court
held that the petitioner bears the liability for procedural default,
but if the default was the result of ineffective assistance,
responsibility for the default is imputed to the state.22 8
Although Justice Blackmun recorded in conference that
Justice Brennan wanted to do away with Engle and the
procedural default tests, and liberalize Strickland, Justice
Brennan's conference memorandum indicates otherwise.2 2 9
Justice Brennan did not believe that Strickland should expand to
cover procedural default cases:
The performance prong of the Strickland test explains at
length that counsel's overall performance must have been
224. Harry A. Blackmun, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Conf. Notes (Oct. 14, 1988) [HAB/530].
225. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
226. Id. at 487-88.
227. See e.g. Harrington v. Richter, _
U.S.
,
, 131 S. Ct. 770, 791 (2011);
Holland v. Fla., _ U.S. _, _,
130 S. Ct 2549, 2571 (2010) (noting that "[w]here a

State is constitutionally obliged to provide an attorney but fails to provide an effective one,
the attorney's failures that fall below the standard set forth in Strickland ... are chargeable
to the State, not to the prisoner," and citing Carrier).
228. Carrier,477 U.S. at 488 (explaining that "[slo long as a defendant is represented by
counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective under the standard
established in Strickland .

.,

we discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of

attorney error that results in a procedural default," but also that "if the procedural default is
the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that
responsibility for the default be imputed to the State").
229. William J. Brennan, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Conf. Memo--Murray v. Carrier
(n.d.) [WJB/I:706]; Harry A. Blackmun, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Conf. Notes,-Murray v.
Carrier(Jan. 24, 1986) [HAB/443].
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inadequate to prove ineffective assistance. It was intended
to, and does, make proof of a single mistake by counsel
insufficient to make out a Sixth Amendment claim, even if
counsel's mistake creates a "reasonable probability" that
the outcome would have been different. 230
By keeping procedural default separate from Strickland-style
consideration of ineffective assistance, the Court narrowed
Strickland'srange.
a. Cases Not Remanded
Typical of the cases held for Strickland that were not
remanded was Berryhill v. Francis,23 1 in which Berryhill
asserted that his counsel failed to investigate the government's
case and present mitigating evidence of possible drug-induced
psychosis. In conference, Justice O'Connor concluded that the
state court was correct in concluding that defense counsel had
conducted ample investigation and made the reasonable decision
not to present this evidence as mitigation. 232
Several cases not remanded were detrimental to the
appellant, but not all were so. For instance, in Foster v.
Lankford,23 3 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding that counsel's decision not to call character witnesses,
failure to seek a recording of a state preliminary hearing and to
request modifications to the jury instructions, and decision not
to voir dire a jury together constituted ineffective assistance.2 3 4
Justice O'Connor noted that the district court "did not apply any
rigid rules," adding that "the one possible ground for faulting the
230. Brennan, supra n. 229; see also Harry A. Blackmun, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Conf.

Notes (Mar. 2, 1986) [HAB/457]. The Court reached a similar result in Smith v. Murray,
477 U.S. 527, 530-32, 535 (1986) (applying procedural-default rule to sustain decision of
state supreme court, and noting that Strickland's ineffectiveness standard required more
than a single error or omission by defense counsel unless that error is "sufficiently
egregious and prejudicial" (quoting Carrier)).
231. For the facts of Berryhill, see Berryhill v. State, 291 S.E.2d 685 (Ga. 1982),
abrogatedon other grounds, Jones v. State, 409 S.E.2d 642 (Ga. 1991).
232. O'Connor, Memo. to the Conf.-Berryhill v. Francis,supra n. 183.

233. 716 F.2d 896 (4th Cir. 1983) (affirming 546 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Va. 1982) without
opinion).
234. Lankford, 546 F. Supp. at 245-49, 253 (describing facts and pointing out that "the
adoption of a trial strategy does not excuse defense counsel's obliviousness to certain
weaknesses in the Commonwealth's evidence").
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court is that its opinion does not emphasize the deference due to

tactical decisions that Strickland emphasizes."23 But she
believed that a remand was unnecessary because the Fourth
Circuit had properly applied Strickland.2 3 6
In Stanley v. Zant, another capital case from the Eleventh
Circuit, Justice O'Connor concluded that neither remand nor a
grant of certiorari was necessary because defense counsel's
determination that multiple general statements of Stanley's good
character during childhood would be cumulative was within the
range of reasonable discretion. 238 Justice Brennan and Justice
Marshall dissented from the denial of certiorari, but only on the
issue of the death penalty's constitutionality, not effectiveness of
counsel. 2 3 9
In Johnson v. McKaskle,240 the Court found that Strickland
did not apply to counsel's performance on appeal. Justice
O'Connor noted in a conference memorandum that counsel's
assistance on appeal
raises quite different questions from those raised by
assistance at trial: there is no constitutional right to an
appeal, and the only cases in which this Court has
considered claims concerning counsel on appeal are equal
protection/due

cases. 241

process

cases,

not Sixth Amendment

b. Cases Remanded
Clearly the Court intended an end to the application of
standards stricter than that established in Strickland.
Determining that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had

235. O'Connor, Memo. to the Conf-Fosterv. Lankford, supra n. 183.

236. Id.
237. 697 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1983).
238. O'Connor, Memo. to the Conf.-Stanley v. Zant, supra n. 183. Justice O'Connor
further noted that the ineffectiveness claim was "the one substantial claim," and that the
Eleventh Circuit "applied standards at least as favorable to petitioner as those articulated in
Strickland," and "gave the record a thorough examination." Id.
239. Stanley v.Kemp, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984).
240. 465 U.S. 1009 (1984); see also Johnson v. State, 627 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Crim. App.
1981). McCaskle would seem to be somewhat at odds with Penson. See text accompanying
nn. 217-24, supra.
241. O'Connor, Memo. to the Conf.-Johnson v. McKaskle, supra n. 183.
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wrongly applied "farce and mockery" in Stafford v. State,242
Justice O'Connor lobbied the Conference for a remand:
Since Strickland adopts a standard significantly different in
form from the "mockery of justice" test, a GVR in light of
Strickland seems in order, even though application of the
Strickland standards on remand will almost certainly result
in reentry of judgment against petitioner.243
Because a majority of the Court did not believe that
Strickland was clearly a prospective-application-only decision, it
prompted state attorneys general to appeal cases decided under
standards more favorable to appellants than those the Court
ultimately created. In Strickland v. King,244 for example, the
Eleventh Circuit found defense counsel to have been ineffective
during the sentencing phase of the trial, which had resulted in a
sentence of death. In voting for a remand, Justice O'Connor
noted that while the Eleventh Circuit followed its more
permissive standard, she thought it "reasonably possible that
reconsideration in light of Strickland" would lead to a change in
the result. 246 Although initially the Eleventh Circuit had not
required King to prove prejudice, it determined on remand that
he had proved ineffective representation resulting in prejudice
242. 665 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (holding that "appellant must show
that counsel's performance was so ineffective that the trial was reduced to a farce or
mockery of justice, or was shocking to the conscience of this Court, or that counsel's
services were only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a pretense, or without adequate
opportunity for conference and preparation," and also noting that "[tihe burden is a heavy
one, and is not satisfied by simply pointing out possible errors in counsel's judgment, or
lack of success in the defense"), vacated sub nom Stafford v. Okla., 467 U.S. 1212 (1984).
The Court of Criminal Appeals replaced the farce-and-mockery standard with a standard
requiring "reasonably competent assistance of counsel" after Stafford's trial but before his
appeal, and held in Stafford that the new standard had no retroactive application. Id.
243. O'Connor, Memo. to the Conf. Re: Case Held for Strickland v. WashingtonStafford v. Okla. (No. 83-5636), supra n. 183 (recommending by reference to "GVR" that
the Court grant certiorari, vacate the decision below, and remand the case for
reconsideration in light of Strickland). Stafford also had a second trial-in which he was
represented by different counsel-that resulted in a second death sentence. Stafford v.
State, 669 P.2d 285 (Okla. 1983), vacated sub nom Stafford v. Okla., 467 U.S. 1212 (1984).
Again, Justice O'Connor was persuaded that Stafford's petition for certiorari "would not be
worthy of review but for one fact": The Court of Criminal Appeals had applied the farceand-mockery test. O'Connor, Memo. to the Conf. Re: Case Held for Strickland v.
Washington-Stafford v. Okla. (No. 83-6125), supra n. 183.
244. 714 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated,467 U.S. 1211 (1984).
245. Id. at 1491.
246. O'Connor, Memo. to the Conf-Strickland v. King, supra n. 183.

262

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

likely to have led to an outcome that would otherwise have been
different.2 4 7
c. The Stevens-O'Connor Dialogue
Illinois v. Williams24 8 and Illinois v. Rainge249 together
presented an issue not directly considered in either Strickland or
Cronic. Williams was sentenced to death for two counts of
murder, and to concurrent extended sentences of sixty years for
two counts of aggravated kidnapping and a single count of
rape. 250 Rainge, his co-defendant, likewise was found guilty but
was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment for
the murders, two terms of sixty ears for the kidnappings, and
one sixty-year term for the rape. Williams appealed, arguing
that his counsel had been ineffective, in part for failing to file a
motion to suppress some evidence, but the court found the
remaining evidence of guilt so overwhelming that no prejudice
resulted. 2
Williams petitioned for rehearing, and while that petition
was pending, his counsel was disbarred for matters unrelated to
his trial.2 53 On rehearing, Williams argued that this disbarment
254
was further proof of his counsel's ineffectiveness. The Illinois

247. King v. Strickland, 748 F.2d 1462, 1464 (11th Cir. 1984) (concluding that "King
has satisfied both the performance and the prejudice prongs" of the Strickland standard).
248. See People v. Williams, 444 N.E.2d 136 (Ill. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Ill. v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 1218 (1984).
249. People v. Rainge, 445 N.E. 535 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Ill.
v. Rainge, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984).
250. Williams, 444 N.E.2d at 137.
251. Rainge, 445 N.E.2d at 537.
252. Williams, 444 N.E.2d at 142 ("[T]he evidence, if believed by the jury as it
apparently was, was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.").
253. Williams, 444 N.E.2d at 312 (citing In re Weston, 442 N.E.2d 236 (Ill. 1982)); see
also Rainge, 445 N.E.2d at 544-45 (same). Weston apparently mishandled the estate of a
deceased client and refused to communicate with the decedent's heirs, and ignored
inquiries from the state disciplinary agency. See Weston, 442 N.E.2d at 435-37; see also
John Paul Stevens, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to the Conf.-Cases Held for U.S. v.
Cronic & Strickland v. Washington (May 18, 1984) (describing the "Illinois Supreme
Court's careful consideration of the relationship between the serious disciplinary
proceedings brought against the lawyer in the capital case and the record before it")
[HAB/401].
254. Williams, 444 N.E.2d at 137 (referring to the court's consideration of the "possible
relevance of the disciplinary matters to the capital case").
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Supreme Court conceded that there was ample evidence to prove
Williams's guilt, but then concluded that defense counsel's
behavior was dispositive: The distraction evident in his
performance because he was laboring under disciplinary charges
while representing Williams and Rainge could be considered a
denial of competent counsel.25 5
Although Justice Stevens urged remands in both cases,
Justice O'Connor disagreed. She pointed out that the Illinois
courts "followed neither the presumed-prejudice analysis
discussed in Cronic, nor the prejudicial-deficient-performance
analysis set forth in Strickland.2 5 6 Instead, she rightly noted that
the state supreme court adopted an "irrebuttable presumption,
not simply of prejudice, but of unprofessional judgment as well
as prejudice." What concerned Justice O'Connor was that under
the unique circumstances of an attorney facing disciplinary
proceedings before a state bar or court, the Court was adopting a
third basis for finding ineffective counsel in violation of the
sixth amendment, and this third standard was impossible for the
state to overcome. In particular, the Illinois Supreme Court did
not acknowledge any actual errors resulting in prejudice
committed by Weston. Most troubling to Justice O'Connor was
that while Williams had standing to move the trial court to
suppress evidence seized from his property but used in both
trials, Rainge did not have standing because the property
belonged to Williams and was found in his vehicle. This made
Rainge's case "a good bit weaker than Williams." 257 In essence,
Justice O'Connor argued that because the Illinois Supreme
Court did not apply any test for acts or omissions to be weighed
against prejudice to the petitioners, a remand in the hope that the
Illinois Supreme Court would apply Stricklandwas worthwhile.

255. Stevens, supra n. 253 (revealing Justice Stevens's belief that the Illinois Supreme
Court "had become convinced that counsel was such a thoroughly disreputable person, and
had been so obsessed by the disbarment proceedings, that he simply could not be trusted to
provide competent representation"). Both Williams and Rainge eventually received new
trials. Williams, 444 N.E.2d at 143 (concluding that Williams was entitled to a new trial);
Rainge, 445 N.E.2d at 547 ("We are of the opinion that the similar interests of Williams
and Rainge and the similar issue raised on the same record require that defendant Rainge
be granted a new trial.").
256. Sandra Day O'Connor, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Memo. to the Conf.-Ill. v. Williams &
Ill. v. Rainge (May 17, 1984) [HAB/394].
257. Id.
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No justice voted to grant Illinois's application for certiorari,

so the case was not remanded. 258 The Court's action, if it could
stand for a jurisprudential principle, is that the Strickland test
may not be necessary when counsel is later disciplined and
disbarred. In that situation, counsel's demonstrated failure to
adhere to standards of professional conduct indicates that he or
she cannot be trusted to have provided competent representation
in cases decided while the disciplinary and disbarment
proceedings were pending. This aspect of the Court's denial of
certiorari in Williams and Rainge makes good sense. A lawyer
who continues to defend his or her reputation and professional
licensure when the state has legitimate evidence of misconduct
is likely to be untrustworthy on other matters and must at a
minimum be distracted by the disciplinary proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Padilla, the Court recently reaffirmed that while the
ABA standards for defense counsel are not binding on courts,
they are valuable measures of the prevailing professional
norms.259 Padilla is thus a continuation of the judicial intent
underlying Strickland. While this article does not seek to
analyze any of the thousands of federal and state appellate
decisions citing to Strickland, the use of a historic model may
help courts return to the original intent of the decision: that it
should not serve as the most difficult barrier to relief for claims
of ineffective assistance, and should be regarded instead as
articulating a middle ground between the permissive and
conservative ends of the spectrum.
Likewise, states are free to adopt more permissive
standards than Strickland's formulation of representation that
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," 260 but the
judiciary should be wary of interpreting any such standard as
being more stringent than the Court intended. The Court did not
258. Ill. v. Rainge, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984) (denying certiorari without dissent, but
including the notation that "Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of
this motion and this petition").
259. 559 U.S. at 366-67 (citing both Strickland and Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4
(2010)).
260. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
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intend to permit this objective standard to evolve into the old
farce-and-mockery standard, or indeed into any other more
difficult standard, or to include an outcome-determinative
approach. Instead, the Court expected that Strickland's plain
language would govern, and the plain language simply requires
proof that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different." 26 1 It does not require
proof of a specific different outcome.
Strickland should be applied with deference to-and
acknowledgement of-its historic origin and judicial intent. The
decision may be considered a compromise, but it was
nonetheless largely independent of the political and social forces
that brought the case to the Court in the first place. It avoided
the tough-on-crime politics behind the appointment of several of
the Justices then on the Court and maintained a space in which
the bar associations could regulate the criminal defense function.
And perhaps most important, Strickland's was a reasonable
middle-ground solution that evolved from a pragmatic
compromise into the means of resolving a constitutional defect.

261. Id. at 694.

